Decline of Political Ideas

 

The previous post Global Decline treated the level of politics in the meaning of how maturely politics is carried out in the rule of countries during modernities. In the present post I will look into the content of political thought. The figure shows this distinction and illustrates the different paths of development of the two concepts.

 

Politics can be defined in several ways. In a broad sense politics concerns the relation between groups of people like estates or classes and the tactics, strategies and ideas involved in handling these relations. This no matter if the relations are harmonious or characterized by conflicts. Understood in this way humanity has always had politics, both in and outside civilizations. In most of world history politics in this sense has concerned the question of power. Which group and which individual rules who. This is also the case for the greatest part of the history of civilisations despite their more advanced thinking.

 

In a more strict meaning politics is about political ideas or ideologies. Realistic or utopian ideas about the best way to organize and rule societies. In this sense politics is something primarily characterising civilizations’ modernities. This type of politics is not primarily about power. Even though as illustrated in Animal Farm we have very often seen that it degenerates because of the wishes for power by a person or a group, the ideas remain dominant.

 

Thus before modernity the question of power dominates politics. The upheavals in the 17^th century e.g. the English Revolutions and the Fronde in France, were about the distribution of power between king, nobility and gentry. But from the American and French Revolutions which mark the beginning of our modernity, ideas about society and distribution of wealth became decisive.

 

This lasts until a time around eight decades before the end of modernity. From then the question of ideas is gradually again replaced by the question of power. This happens through a process of political simplification and polarization, something which we are experiencing now. In the end, after modernities people and historians will be unable to understand the content and the extent of politics based on ideas. They will typically interpret their own and other past modernities as having been competition for personal power. In our civilization we will reach this level of lack of understanding around 2200, i.e. one century after the end of our modernity.

 

As illustrated in the figure above, politics based on ideas and the public interest in them remain at a constant high level throughout most of a modernity. Clearly this level is not the same as the degree of maturity with which these ideas are implemented. But as we will see below, during their decline in the end of a modernity the two developments converge.

 

Examples of such ideas or ideologies range from Rousseau’s Du Contrat Social over different varieties of Liberalism, capitalism, Marxism or Socialism to Fascism. But also the political programs of political parties are examples. Such ideologies or clusters of ideas are what the French philosopher Lyotard called Grand Narratives. As pointed out by him and others, these ideologies are loosing their attraction in the present late or “post” modern era.

 

This process may be seen in the following way:

An ideology consists of a number of opinions about past, present and desirable future conditions and means to realize the latter. Viewed in a schematic manner these opinions represent different dimensions, where each opinion is somewhere on an axis. Abortion or the desire for money can be seen as good or bad or somewhere between these poles. The entire ideology consists of a more or less complicated structure of such dimensions held together by a narrative which explains and justifies them. Many political parties have identified themselves with specific versions of ideologies. The individuals in a society also have their own set of opinions or dimensions on different topics. Their degree of adherence to a certain ideology or political party is based on the degree of overlap between their opinions with those of the ideology or party.

 

Of course all this is pretty banal. It becomes more interesting when put in a historical context. In contrast to the complicated picture of ideologies in modernities, the political opinions before the Age of Enlightenment were relatively simple and mostly concerned to which person or group power should belong. Then came two centuries dominated by true ideologies. Now nearing the end of our modernity we see certain trends simplifying and ultimately dissolving the complicated political thinking based on ideas or ideologies.

 

There are several reasons behind the political simplifications. One cause is probably that as with old fashions people get tired of old ideas. Another is that through development the societies and hence the thinking about them become increasingly complex. Many people including politicians find this difficult to grasp no matter the intellectual hyper-reflexivity postulated by Giddens. This is even more the case for non-intellectuals. It may lead to the political indifference postulated by thinkers like Lyotard. But what is worse, there is also another reaction; the well-known wish for simple solutions.

 

Applied to the mentioned dimensions of political opinion the simplifications can be summarized as five trends:

 

1] The number of political questions or dimensions regarded as important is reduced to a few. Then a political world view can easily be remembered and formulated as a handful of slogans.

 

2] More and more often people place their opinion concerning each of the dimensions at one of the extreme poles. The nuances between them are lost. You are either pro-choice or pro-life.

 

3] The dimensions tend to collapse i.e. become tied together. If you mean one thing on a certain topic, then your meaning on other topics is given. You loose more nuances in this way as opinions become rigidly locked together. If you are pro-life you are also pro-gun and anti-Obama-care.

 

4] Often one of the dimensions become dominant and all-decisive, and thereby it determines the rest of the group of interlocked opinion-dimensions. For Evangelicals abortion has often been the dominant dimension leading to other opinions and to a vote for Donald Trump despite his obvious sins.

 

Clearly trends 2], 3] and 4] together come close to being a definition of extreme political polarization, and all four can be seen in present politics in many countries.

 

When we make historical comparisons with previous civilizations or we simply extrapolate a fifth trend becomes clear:

5] Increasingly the dominant dimension will be the question of who is the leader; who shall rule the country? The person who should is then seen as only good and without faults. The person at the other pole of this dimension, the one who should not rule is viewed as utterly evil. Donald Trump is a good example of this personalization of politics. But the trend is a general phenomenon as can be seen in many populist and autocratic rulers around the World.

 

Voters, parties and demagogues mutually reinforce the five trends. Typically parties start exploiting and  thereby amplify the simplifications which are spreading in the population. Then politicians begin to believe their own lies. Demagogues start to exploit both voters and parties. In our modernity where the elites mentally are now approaching the level of the population, even intelligent and cultivated people and media are affected by polarization.

 

Political parties fall into their own trap. Even though the parties themselves initially may not be that polarized, they use polarizations of the electorate to gain votes by making the divisions more extreme, placing themselves and the opponents at the opposite extreme poles of the dimensions. Thereby the parties demonize each other. Now it is difficult to retreat from their own rhetoric if they want to keep their new voters satisfied. And sooner or later simple cognitive mechanisms make the politicians of the parties identify with their simplifying and polarizing rhetoric. Thus what was initially tricks to fool voters have become reel characteristics of the parties.

 

Denmark is right now carrying out an interesting experiment. Especially since the beginning of the Corona-pandemic this country was well underway to American conditions. The political parties had made many voters believe that their opponents were wholly bad. Social media were filled with outright hatred. But the parties had not yet become fully identified with their rhetoric. Now after the recent elections they have showed incredible courage by forming a coalition government consisting of both sides of the division. It will be interesting to follow whether this will also reverse the polarization of the electorate or the feelings of betrayal will cost so many voters that the experiment will fail.

 

Another trap is if parties rely on a populist demagogue as a tool to gain voters. They risk that the tool reduces the party to become his or her own tool.

 

Presently, political opinions are still of great importance. It is also a fact that throughout modernity persons often have been important in politics. But over the next decades the question of who is the leader will become all- dominant. This dimension will tower far above the more political dimensions. These will continue to matter, but mean less and less. As these lower ranking dimensions of opinion are tied to the dominant dimension of the leader, this person can change policies anytime. Then we can no longer talk about political parties. In the end, probably shortly after 2100 politics will have lost most ideas and ideologies and will only concern power of persons and groups of persons.

Then modernity will be over.

 

As said, the ideological content of politics described here is something else than the level of political maturity treated in my last post. But in their decline the two developments run in parallel and reinforce each other. Or put another way: the same developments undermine both the ideas and their implementation. The Greco-Roman (ca. 330-30 BC) and our own modernity have a simultaneous decline in the ideological content of politics and political maturity. Both the simplifications, the polarization and the increasing role of persons are points of overlap. We have a dangerous mix where politics is carried out in an irresponsible manner which is without ideals and tries to reduce the complexities of World, society and politics to a few simple dichotomies. Wise strategies are replaced by opportunistic acts by the dominant leaders who alone decide. Complex societies cannot be administered in such a way. And this even less if one half of the population values the opposite extremes of the dichotomies.

 

As said, after the end of a modernity people and historians will increasingly wonder what all the fuzz and the conflicts in the three centuries were about. Like in a historical novel it will be reinterpreted as having had to do only with hate and love. Political parties will be understood as factions only fighting for dominance, heir leaders only aspiring personal power. But exactly this is what political parties and political groups and their leaders will have developed into. Several political parties in the World, not least the US Republicans are already moving in this direction.

 

Like in the previous post we may ask if the depletion of politics is unavoidable? The experiences from the Greco-Roman and the Oriental civilization seem to suggest that this is the case. But again the Song Dynasty (960-1279) in the second Chinese modernity gives hope. As we saw, this modernity did not move only up and then continuously down in politically maturity, but rather both up and down and up again. And when we look at the content of politics, polarization and personal power did indeed matter, but ideas continued to be immensely important to the end, not least in the form of the Neo-Confucian party. Thus in principle the present depletion of politics can be stopped. But this will demand responsible and courageous political elites in the leading parties.

 

Global Decline

A neo-fascist has been elected as prime minister in Italy. A racist anti-democratic party is a big part of Netanyahu’s winning coalition. In America many Republicans are openly working against democracy. That Trump-backed candidates did worse than expected in the midterm elections gives only little comfort. US politicians and voters are still split by an antagonism which often amounts to mutual hatred. Bad times indeed for mature politics.

 

In earlier posts I have talked about the political decline characterising the present stage of late modernity. The preceding stage of mature modernity  forms the background to this. As written earlier, the modernities of civilisations are inherently unstable periods filled with conflicts in and between the nations of the civilization. Nevertheless we see parts of a modernity which can be termed mature or at least as more mature than the other parts of this period. These mature stages are naturally often found around the middle of the roughly three centuries a modernity lasts. Thus we can conceptualise a modernity as a curve with the degree of maturity rising from a low point to a maximum and then falling back.

 

A mature political system can be defined as a type of rule where the rulers are subject to surveillance and control by institutions and by politicians and people with differing opinions. Generalized we can talk about checks and balances. In this way a government does not get almighty and it can be stopped if it’s policies are perceived as wrong. We can call a such political system pluralistic. Importantly, another criterion for maturity is that the controls are not so interfering that it results in instability or in inaction. A mature political system like this can be implemented in the form of a democracy built on the partitioning of three powers proposed by Montesquieu. But it can also be implemented in other political systems.

 

Of course a symmetric curve rising to political maturity and then falling again is a highly idealised picture and a gross oversimplification. There are big variations between different nations, and there are marked discontinuities caused by events like revolutions, coup d’états, economic crises and devastating wars. But despite this the curve gives a good overview and permits comparisons between regions and countries.

 

The central nations and the surrounding nations and the periphery of a civilization all develop in different paces and reach different levels of maturity. If we draw the idealised curve mentioned above for the three different cases it may look like this:

 

 

 

The uppermost curve could represent North Europe. The middle curve could be South Europe. The United States would then be somewhere between these two. The curve at the bottom is the third world. The nations on the lower curves never achieve the highest possible level of maturity before it all reverts again. The downward trend which has begun now ends the maturation in the south before it reaches the level of Scandinavia and West Germany. This is because this trend characterizes the whole of the civilization and chokes the maturation process everywhere no matter how high or low levels were achieved.

 

But does it have to end like this? No not necessarily. If we look at the modernities of the two civilizations which most closely resemble our, we see two possibilities. In the Greco-Roman world the trend after the reform-attempts by Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus around 130 BC only went downwards. But in the second Chinese modernity in the Song Dynasty the developments went both down and up again. During this time there was a carefully elaborated system of checks and balances which controlled the government and made sure that there always were political opponents involved in decision making and rule. Criticism was encouraged and was both institutionalised and emerging from an open public debate. But around 1070 the reform politician Wang Anshi and his followers concentrated almost all power in their hands and thereby for a time neutralized the controlling of the government. Like in today’s world the polarization between left and right was enormous. Here we can indeed talk about a decline of politics. But somehow the country found its way back to a balance between government and controls. Thus the declining trend was reverted, probably because of the stabilizing power of a very deep state. This example shows that the fall of the curve is not a law. But in our case the development begins to look more like the one in Rome.

 

To take a modern European example, the tragic turn of events is clear in present Italy. This country never became as politically stable as the countries to the north, and in the last decades it’s political landscape is dominated by populist parties from left to right. For the third world the situation is even worse. Latin America had just left the long era of military dictatorships behind, and for a couple of decades it has enjoyed more mature political conditions. But now populism and polarization threatens to ruin this again. Just look at Brazil. In Latin America like elsewhere economic problems accelerate the process of decline. Matters are even worse in Africa. Parts of this continent will never reach even a small degree of maturity before it is already over again.

 

But also if we look at nations in the central parts of our civilization, things look gloomy. France has for a long time been plagued by the right-wing populist Front National and now it’s voters are dominated by right and left-wing populist parties poised to ruin the necessary reforms wanted by Macron.

 

Communist East Europe is a special case as it’s countries went from foreign dominance to a high level of maturity in the northern parts, but now these  countries too are in political decay.

 

The United Kingdom has seen an unbelievably rapid decline with the help of UKIP and other demagogues, not least Boris Johnson. Even more tragic, the United States thanks to polarizing rhetoric and policies from both political parties, but above all because of Donald Trump and his supporters in the Republican party, will descend into violent upheavals alternating with periods of dictatorship. Thus even though the central nations of the Western civilization have experienced high degrees of maturation, their present fall is dramatic.

 

As said above, maturity is not necessarily the same as western style democracy. The two major countries in the northern hemisphere calling themselves socialist - but which were and when we talk about China, is an integral part of the Western civilization - also reached higher degrees of maturity, both in the decades where they had collective leaderships, i.e. the Soviet Union after Khrushchev and China after Mao. In the first case this ended with the breakup of the USSR. In modern westernised China the period seems to end with the present one-man rule and it’s indefinite prolongation.

 

In the USSR and China under collective Communist party rule roughly 1965-1990 and 1980-2020 respectively the checks and balances came from more or less institutionalised groups with differing views within the Communist parties. This version of pluralist rule functioned with the same stability as the one which characterized the northern Western type democracies. In China the system resulted in a long period with a remarkable combination of political stability, intelligence and adaptability. As said, the system which enabled this seems to be ending with the new indefinite one-man rule.

 

A prime minister in a country like Germany can also sit for several successive periods, but in this case the power-limiting mechanisms and an opposition is in place. That stability is possible in a democratic system with power shifts between parties and constantly criticizing oppositions is by no means obvious. It can only function in a mature manner if and as long as responsible elites dominate the ruling political parties and guide the voters. These conditions have ended in several hitherto mature democracies as the elites mentally degenerate down to the level of the mob (even though they economically may be well above the people in wealth).

 

Any end to the characteristics of the two stable pluralistic types, i.e. the collective Communist and the Western democratic political systems, are symptoms of the political decline: instability, demagogy, populism, polarization and authoritarian one-man rule. If necessary, the authoritarian version can function as a remedy against the more chaotic versions, but only if it is not installed too early, if the leader makes the right decisions and if power is not a goal in itself. Otherwise it will sooner or later be challenged from within. Moreover, a present intelligent leader can be followed by one who is unworthy but who nevertheless inherits the absolute power.

 

By now I see only one major nation still upholding a high level of mature modernity: Germany. But the quickly shifting patterns of the German voters is one warning. Worse, certain utterances and obstructive policies from the present opposition leader do sound unpleasant in content and tone. It shows that even in this country political maturity is not guaranteed now where our whole civilization is in free fall. German politicians bear a heavy responsibility for not letting this last island be inundated too.

 

But what will the degradation of the political systems mean for the concept of democracy in itself? In an earlier post I have written that the Greco-Roman civilization and our Western one are characterized by what may be termed European democracy, a strong wish for and often also implementation of direct involvement of the people in rule or the selection of ruling people. Past and present experience show that even though the modern version of this kind of rule is presently in crisis, this does not imply that the ideal is also weakened. Like numerous examples from Burma over Iran to Latin America and Africa show, the wish for freedom is impossible to extinguish.

 

That American democracy fails will only strengthen the ideal. Hitherto democracy is being used as a justification for US dominance just like economic growth is being used as an argument for Chinese dominance. With the present and future internal developments in the United States it will be clear to everyone that this power isn’t any longer synonymous with true democracy. Thus the ideal will be freed from power-political dirt.

 

After a sufficiently long time filled with the chaos of late modernities a civilization is ripe for the final authoritarian rule by emperors or whichever title they may carry. We are  not there yet. It may take at least seven decades of internal and international troubles before we are ready for our Augustus or Di.

 

The strength of European democracy is clear from the Antique example. Despite the authoritarian rule by the Roman emperors on the federal level the constituent city states of the empire still had their internal often democratic constitutions. Just look at the election campaign conserved in Pompeii. The Roman empire was “One country, several systems”. Our future global empire(s) must be of the same type to be viable in a world still striving for the maximally possible degree of freedom: Authoritarian on the federal level and democratic in the subdued countries.

 

 

Epilogue 

But to return to the present and coming decades until one or two or three empires unite the world, isn’t there any hope of escaping the decline? Well, as stated earlier, history may seem to run in large civilizations displaced in time repeating overall developments, but especially the specifics are not determined by law. We still have a degree of freedom to choose. And as shown by the Song Dynasty a decline can be reversed. On the background of accelerating climate disasters it is time to pull the brakes on the decay. Now is not  the time for the usual stereotypical childish games of power between politicians and between countries, games that have plagued most civilizations in their late phases. Especially not if these games degrade politicians and peoples to animals for whom power is more important than humankind. The global consequences of the war in Ukraine have clearly exposed our vulnerability. These consequences are microscopic in comparison with what global warming will cause.

 

Russian Roulette

 

Face it. The four Ukrainian regions incorporated into Russia after pseudo -referendums will remain Russian territory.

 

The alternatives are grim. If you seriously want to enable Ukraine to take the areas back, it will be necessary with Western military aid which is over the Russian threshold for unpleasant retribution. Then we are no longer talking about limiting energy supplies or bombing ones own pipelines, but about means which can do considerable harm to Ukrainian or western resources or civilians. It could potentially be a Zivilisationsbruch of enormous dimensions.

 

Aiding Ukraine on this level would increase strain on a leadership already under pressure from several external and internal forces. And do not hope for a regime change. A such would with all likelihood worsen things further. Remember also that even though the level of Western aid may now be under the threshold, the same level can be perceived as being over this limit in case of major Russian reverses. You never know when the threshold is reached.

 

You are balancing on a knife edge. Or formulated another way: the Western countries are playing Russian roulette.

 

Of course the above comments contain nothing which is new to experts. Remark also that this blog post is not meant as a moral judgement about any side in the conflict. It is a warning against a dangerous escalation which could become an existential threat for millions. Do we want to commit suicide for four Ukrainian regions? Thus, even though it is bad from the viewpoint of moral and international law, we must face the facts.

 

Politicians in leading positions must distinguish between rhetoric and realpolitik, or should we say realkrieg. It is nothing new, but it is more and more often the case in present late modernity that not only the public and the media, but also politicians are unable to make this distinction. If we say it then we will also do it. And if we don’t do it then the newspapers and the opposition will attack us violently. Clearly this is dangerous. Forcing politicians to keep their word may sound democratic, but in declined politics infected by demagogy it can lead to uncalculated risks.

 

You may accuse me of supporting Russian attempts to create fear by keeping us wondering about what Moscow may do or not do. But how sure are you that Russian threats are only bluff? And will they continue to be bluff no matter the movements of the military front? And what if the opposite player is suddenly replaced by another who with certainty does not bluff?

 

Continue to condemn, but in realpolitik you must ignore your own public statements and find a modus vivendi with the facts.

 

 

Don’t let this get out of control

 Bombs damaging gas pipelines. What will be the next target? Submarine internet connections? By now the vulnerability of the global society should be obvious. Also far below the threshold of a direct full scale war between the big powers, our intertwined and complex world can be seriously damaged by small actions.

 

Thus, also without military counterattack, a power under pressure has possibilities for striking back, possibilities unparalleled in history.

Russophobia

 Some East European countries are closing their borders for Russian refugees fleeing military recruitment for the war in Ukraine. Embarrassing indeed! This shows that we are talking about a generalized racism against all Russians, even opponents of the enemy in Moscow.

 

Earlier I predicted that the Russian invasion would westernize East Europe politically and culturally. Several developments and not least that borders are being closed for Russians turning westwards give doubt concerning the cultural aspect. Instead, returning Russian refugees to Russia shows that these East European countries mentally are approaching rather than distancing themselves from Russia.

 

If also Ukraine were to join the EU, then the Union would have a giant Eastern LGBT-free region breaking down democracy and abusing Brussels in their fight against Russia, against all Russian and against all Russians. This even though the eastern region in internal politics and culture would resemble Russia closely…