Poles and Civilisations

  

 

In earlier posts I have analysed polarisation as a phenomenon which a) divides the political world view into two opposite possibilities and b) let these possibilities become radical. In the beginning we only see political actors through such glasses. Soon the actors adopt this view and do become radicalised. I mostly looked at it within the Second European, now global civilisation. Here it is valid both within and between nations.

 

At the same time some argue that we live in a multipolar world. In reality matters are both simpler and much more complicated. Obviously, beside the two main world powers there are other big players, notably Russia, India and the EU, and there are countless intra- and international conflicts and micro-poles, but in comparison to the giants US, China and partly Russia these conflicts are insignificant unless they serve as proxies for the biggest. India could seem destined to become a superpower, but it is too heterogeneous and has been ruled in an almost autocratic way focused on very few political views favouring only Hindus and only parts of the spectrum of opinions. I have earlier criticised such rules, and they are even more self-defeating in a country as heterogeneous as India. Divisive rule does not make a nation a superpower unless the country is all mighty like the United States. The EU is also too divided to be taken seriously. Russia, because of its huge nuclear arsenal and vast strategic area, is close in strength to the superpowers, but as often stated, it is partly outside our civilisation.

 

Thus within our civilisation we are left with two major int’l poles, the United States and China. But what complicates matters is the additional presence of civilisation ‘poles’, if this word can be applied here. These are poles of another type and on a different higher level than the duality inside our own. As often said, civilisations are large units each encompassing several nations, and having a duration of at least 18 centuries with distinct phases. Different civilisations run in parallel but displaced in time, and crucially, they all have their individual culture or characteristics. Presently three are alive: a) the Second European, now global, b) the Oriental and c) the East European. Both their difference in phase resulting from the time-displacement and the different characters add extra antagonisms to the World. These are between civilisations, not within one. The antagonisms are both political and cultural.

 

To be able to better distinguish between these types of poles, I will introduce the term  “Sino-Western Civilisation”. In previous posts I have pointed to the extreme similarities between on the one hand the two European Civilisations and on the other hand the two Chinese Civilisations. When we look specifically at the phase of modernity the similarities between the present Globalised European Civilisation and China during the Song Dynasty (960-1279) are especially striking, e.g. in the checking and balancing of power, public debate and in phenomena like impressionist painting, technology and monetary system . The Song political system even managed to extend this modernity which started with the great revolutionary upheavals in the late ninth century to a duration of four centuries instead of the three typical for civilisations. It was only because of the final Mongolian invasions that China in 1279 arrived in the imperial autocratic rule which in all civilisations follows after a modernity. The long duration was probably due to the continued and always revitalised political debates and sharing of power which secured novel solutions and adaptations. Occasionally the country swung towards autocracy or was too pluralistic to be governable, but a balance was always reestablished.

 

 Unfortunately our Civilisation seems not to be able to do this. The “Free World” turns chaotic, while the other part becomes autocratic. Both are part of the decline. If we continue on this path, our modernity will end a little after 2100 after the usual duration of three centuries.

 

The extreme perturbations introduced in the nineteenth century by the European colonial powers can be seen as causing a re-awakening of older civilisations, especially their modernities. Thus after several centuries of stagnation China has re-entered a modernity. This one is a fusion of the re-awoken autochthon Song-time and the very similar present European / global modernity. As a) the two civilisations are now in the same phase and b) they are so similar, they can together be seen as the major representatives of a hybrid Sino-Western Civilisation.

 

 From within this Sino-Western Civilisation the world is often seen as only two pervasive diametrically opposite poles led by the two superpowers respectively. Affected by present hyper-polarisation, it all seems very simple.

West vs rest

Democracy vs dictatorship

Individual freedom vs state control etc.

Almost all conflicts in the world are understood as or they are pressed into subordinate emanations of this dichotomy. The big players even tend to adopt the prejudices of the other and confirm them.

 

All this entails that you ally yourself with any country with which you share aspects of one of the poles and distance yourself from other countries unless they are or can be made allies. Obviously at the same time, the big players try to keep or win allies and friends in the spheres of each other, no matter the internal policies of these potential allies. Especially if they are located at geographically or politically strategic places.

 

If we now add the layer of civilisations it turns out that this polarity is NOT the superordinate one. We may add three civilisational polarities and thus arrive at four dominating antagonisms:

 

1) In the Sino-Western Civilisation of course US vs China. They are presently in the internal endfight for hegemony inside our civilisation .

 

2) The Sino-Western Civilisation vs the old Oriental Civilisation, mainly the United States vs Iran and many radical Arabs.

 

3) The Sino-Western Civilisation vs the young East European Civilisation, presently the United States and Western Europe vs Russia plus east-west tensions in the EU.

 

4) The East European Civilisation vs the Oriental Civilisation. Presently  this mainly involves strong anti-immigrant attitudes in East Europe and Caucasian terrorists attacking Russia.

 

The first of these polarities is intra-civilisational, the others are inter-civilisational, cf. the levels introduced below.

 

 This gives rise to a complicated pattern which can be analysed as a series of levels with interactions within and between the levels.

 

LEVEL 1. Supra-poles = civilisations

The uppermost level is the civilisational. Here we of course have three supra-poles; the Sino-Western Civilisation, the East European Civilisation and the Oriental Civilisation. 

 

LEVEL 2. Poles within civilisations

On the second level we have the poles within each of these civilisations, eg.

 

a) In the Sino-Western Civilisation the United States vs China plus the minor players EU and India.

 

b) In the East European Civilisation Russia vs parts of East Europe.

 

c) In the Oriental Civilisation things are not that simple. Here important units and divisions often do not follow the political national borders, see below. For now I will just say politico -religious moderates vs radicals (not primarily terrorists).

 

LEVEL 3. Sub-poles within the poles

Below the poles we have several sub-poles with a certain duration like Republicans and Democrats, France and Germany plus many others.

 

Today’s dominating political thinking and actions are based on the framework of theSino-Western Civilisation. Here the relations and antagonisms are typically seen as were they between bricks on levels 2 and 3. The bricks differ in politics and strength, but otherwise they are seen as equal. The uppermost level of civilisations is too often forgotten in the equation. The levels below is the realm where so-called real-politic tries to operate.

 

But it is a question how “real” these politics can be if they do not take the difference of civilisations into account. In reality the entities on these lower levels are more and more influenced by the supra-level of civilisations.

 

 

ELABORATIONS

 

I. Oriental Civilisation vs Sino-Western Civilisation

 Hitherto the countries on both sides of this antagonism or at least their leaders have been on the way to a reconciliation based on the common focus on money. As said earlier, this inter-civilisation-antagonism is mainly the Orient vs the American part of our civilisation. The United States is perceived as a more alien part of our culture than China. It has a a history of petro- imperialism and above all, past and present support for Israel. Compared to this, the Uighur people are forgotten in the Middle East in return for money. A more and more right-wing Israel obviously counteracts the reconciliation between Orient and Occident. Iran and it’s proxies do the same.

 

The Orient has more than two important poles. Often mentioned is Sunni vs Shia, but almost more important is the division between a) opponents of the United States / Israel and b) collaborating governments. In many countries this last antagonism runs in parallel with the poles people vs rulers. The collaborating governments are pressed by their peoples which are enraged by the fate of the Palestinians. This process can renew the focus on the cultural uniqueness of the Oriental peoples. At the same time racist populations and right wing populists in Europe and America press their leaders and further increase the cultural alienation. It is important to note that the antagonism between the two Civilisations on both sides involves bigger segments of the populations and not only extremists.

 

During the Arab spring, a further set of poles was that between western-oriented democrats vs autocratic rulers. But the democratic pole was quickly subdued by Islamists and discredited by economic problems. The cultural alienation and the Israeli policies act in the same direction.

 

The vast Moslem populations between New Guinea and the Indus were originally a part of the Second Indian Civilisation. Here Hindus and Moslems were two poles. As a result of the general alienation between the West and the Middle East plus Hindu nationalism these South and South East Asian Moslems could increasingly tend to identify themselves with and become attracted into the Oriental Civilisation. This could double the size of this civilisation, a process with global ramifications. The policies of recent Israeli governments and the BJP can only accelerate this.

 

II. East European Civilisation vs Sino-Western Civilisation

As often said, East Europe seems to represent an emerging own civilisation.The Eastern part, i.e. Russia, is trying to leave our civilisation entirely. The Western part, i.e. the other East European countries are more moderate as they are culturally influenced from west. Politically they are of course part of the EU, but culturally they are not assimilated. Instead they act as a fifth column from an alien civilisation in the EU. Here they add to the general right-wing populism present in many West European countries, further weakening the cohesion of the EU. An inclusion of Ukraine into this union would increase its disintegration.

 

Obviously the East European countries immediately bordering Russia (and Belarus) are politically opponents of Russia, while some East European countries further to the west are often more positive. But all three belts (Russia, it’s hostile immediate neighbours and countries further to the west)  from Vladivostok to Belgrade, Budapest and Bratislava share parts of the same culture in different degrees. This culture gains in strength as our world declines.

 

The conflict which started with the Russian invasion of Ukraine is both intra-civilisational inside the East European Civilisation and inter-civilisational between the Sino-Western and the East European Civilisations.

 

 

CONCLUSION

The simultaneous presence of more than one set of poles makes understanding of and manoeuvring in the present world demanding. For a Sino-Western actor, the situation is often understood as a competition between America, China and Russia in a world with insignificant medium- and small-sized countries and a Middle Eastern wasp’s nest. From the viewpoint of power, this interpretation is indeed valid. It is only a natural part of the triangulation of power and the drive towards equilibrium that China and Russia are allied despite their difference in civilisation. The alliances between America and conservative Arab regimes can be viewed in the same light.

 

Alliances and conflicts can be on and between all the mentioned three levels. But because of the simplistic view of only one set of poles, the poles in the other antagonisms are seen as proxies of the players in the Sino-Western Civilisation.

 

Generally, the differences between civilisations are of immense importance and should always be taken in to the global equation. Presently they are increasing in strength as Russia and partly also the rest of East Europe isolate themselves culturally, Israel and Iran radicalise the Middle Eastern populations and immigration-driven racism grows in western populations.

 

Such increasing cultural and political alienation between the three civilisations will put strain on alliances and unions such as US-Arab relations, the EU and India.

 

 

Efficient Rule

  

  

Every country needs efficient rule. This is especially important for nations in competition for power with others. It decides which nation is strongest. How this efficacy is achieved is dependent on things like culture, world location, degree of development and above all historical phase. I have earlier talked about how rule changes or should change as the political decline progresses. But I have not been sufficiently clear. In the following I will focus on developed countries. I will relate efficient rule to three phases of politics during mature and late modernity. In order to gain an understandable generalized overview over this vast and complicated topic things will be somewhat simplified. I will not burden the reader with historical examples, just say that the models serving as basis primarily are the modernities in the Greco-Roman and the First and Second Chinese Civilizations supplemented with extrapolations of our own modernity.

 

Modernities, in our case from ca 1800 to 2100, can be divided into three overall phases: a) Early, b) Mature and c) Late or declining modernity. A decline of politics characterizes the last of these phases. The degree of maturity in the second phase depends on which civilization we look at. The Second Chinese Civilization and the present global Second European Civilization have reached the highest levels, in our case perhaps 1900-2000, some countries from 1945.

 

During early modernity we had unbalanced relations between societal and political groupings resulting in conflicts and revolutions. This was gradually stabilized during the following phase of political maturity. It happened through an absolutely crucial partitioning of power. This was both between different institutionalized powers like courts, lawmaking and governments and between representations of different classes and interest-groups. Groups without representation were also involved in the shaping of laws. The balancing of society and the political system happened both through institutional balances / checks and through political surveillance of governments from oppositions and public opinion. You could say that the pluralism of societies was accommodated by making sure that institutions and politics mirrored the societal pluralism: rule itself was pluralistic i.e. collective.

 

This could be implemented through western representational democracy where the different societal groups elected and were guided by their political parties. But political pluralism could also be achieved in other ways, e.g. through one-party collective leaderships.

 

These systems functioned relatively well, but only as long as society and politics were mature. What this means is easier to see when we look at the following post-mature phase of declining late modernity.

 

The French philosopher Lyotard and others have suggested that we are entering a “postmodern” time, where belief in the political and religious ideologies disappear. But this vision mostly fits the intellectual elites and is a far too simple picture. Politics is certainly not dead yet. Neither is modernity.

 

We can divide late modernity and its political development into two sub-phases:

 

1) The present extreme polarization of societies and politics. It is not postmodern in the sense of lost interest in politics. As described in my earlier posts, politics becomes very simplified, but political (and religious) interest is not reduced. On the contrary, it is immensely increased and affects almost all. Even the once self-declared “postmodern” intellectuals become re-politicized and participate in the shitstorms. Every citizen and politician repeat the same predictable stereotypical extreme arguments and counter-arguments. People are no longer guided by responsible parties, but become puppets of the extreme opinions of other people and demagogues.

 

2) It is not until the second sub-phase of late modernity that interest in politics per se begins to disappear. But it is not replaced by a postmodern indifference. Meanings are as strong as before, but now they are no longer about the choice of policy. Instead the question is which person should be the ruler of one or more nations. Politics may be used as an argument, but both politics and parties are reduced to mere tools for power-hungry personalities. Rudiments of this are visible already now, but we have not yet arrived in this sub-phase.

 

That late modernity has this division into the two sub-phases, implies two different answers to what efficient rule is, one for each sub-phase. In the present polarized sub-phase the division or rupture of society has risen to levels which must be controlled. This can happen through a continuation of the pluralistic rule from mature modernity, but with the crucial difference, that it must now be authoritarian. In mature modernity societal and political diversities were accommodated. In the present first sub-phase of late modernity they must be controlled. Pluralistic rule must absolutely be continued, but with a reduction of influence of the political extremes. In two- or multiparty countries this implies that the center-oriented parts of the main political parties together exert a mildly authoritarian power. The political parties should be freed of influence of radicals. Formal power can shift between the parties via elections, but they should agree on important basics. Parties at the extremes must similarly be controlled, but not be outlawed. Angry people should be guided, but they need to have a voice. No attempt to crush them can succeed. The internet must be partly controlled to make sure that the angry voices and their fake news don’t get echoed and amplified and propagated.

 

In America this would mean that moderate Republicans and moderate Democrats de facto get rid of or better subdue their extreme wings and make an implicit alliance, which despite nominal elections controls society and politics in a moderately authoritarian manner. Obviously, a development like this is very unlikely in the United States. It may be too late now where the extremists in the GOP are taking over the party.

 

In one-party ruled countries the pluralistic authoritarian rule can naturally be in continuation of the collective rule of mature modernity.

 

 I repeat, in the present polarized first sub-phase of late modernity nations must still be ruled collectively in one- or multiparty conditions as they were in the preceding mature phase. But in order to ensure a degree of cohesion and inner and outer strength a certain degree of authoritarian rule is necessary. Here it is very important to distinguish between a) collective authoritarian rule and b) autocratic one-man rule. As long as societies and leaders are focused on politics and are divided and polarized, it is necessary that governance should encompass different opinions. Even though the extremes must be subdued, there should be a pluralistic/collective rule by people representing a certain width of diverging views. It is too narrow if only one person decides. In that case important societal and political forces are kept out of influence. This will result in counter-pressure, unrest, destabilization and sudden changes of power. 

 

Our goal in the present difficult times of trouble must be to keep our countries as stable as possible as long as possible through a measured control. The alternative is internal and external chaos and widespread suffering which will add to the effects of climate change. 

 

It is not until the last sub-phase of declining modernity where interest in politics per se disappears, that autocratic one-man rule can succeed and ultimately - in the universal empire after the end of modernity - become a lasting solution. One ruler can only hope to represent whole society, when politics is dead.

 

How to win the World - and lose it again

  

 

Nineveh, you have been hurt badly, and nothing can heal your wound. Everyone who hears the news of your destruction claps their hands. They are all happy, because they all felt the pain you caused again and again.

 

The prophet Nahum (3:19) on the fall of the Assyrian capital Nineveh.

 

As often said, the present Second European, now global Civilization is now in the late part of its modernity. This is a phase where few remaining big powers fight to gain control over the nations and create a universal state. In many earlier civilizations this endfight has been decided militarily. Because such a fight on the big scale today would be suicidal, we will rather see confrontations in other spheres. The internet will be the battlefield both in the form of direct cyber-warfare implying attacks on essential infrastructure etc. and a more subtle manipulation and competition to win support from the world’s public opinion. Because large scale military confrontations are excluded (as we must hope) and a direct cyber-attack on a superpower and its closest allies in present doctrines are viewed as a casus belli, hybrid internet-warfare and competition for sympathy will be of the utmost importance in deciding which power will take over the world: Minor powers can be convinced politically or economically or be bribed or persuaded to enter the sphere of a superpower, especially if this is perceived as benevolent. 

 

Even though direct internet-attacks from an opposing superpower against smaller powers allied to a superpower can cause war, this is not the case for cyber-attacks or pressure from a superpower on its own allies or on weak nations. Europe and Latin America should be prepared.

 

The importance of good PR has existed in the endfight in all civilizations, even the most militarily violent. In the following I will use examples from earlier civilizations to illustrate the balance between a) force and b) perceived benevolence. With “force” I mean things like military might, political coercion, economic pressure and presently cyber-attacks on essential services.

 

Obviously, the perceived benevolence or popularity of a major power has an inverse relation to its use of force, but it depends on numerous factors. These include propaganda and the unpopularity of opposing superpowers. It is also important to notice that the two factors, force and benevolence should be applied not in an erratic manner, but consistently as part of c) a longer term strategy.

 

 

MODELS AND EXAMPLES

Good models for our present endfight are the Greco-Roman Civilization, the Second Mesopotamian Civilization and the First Chinese Civilization. 

 

1) Rome, Greco-Roman Civilization 

The easiest example is if there is only one superpower and it only has weak opponents. Especially after the fall of Cartage around 200 BC Rome was in this position in the endfight in the Greco-Roman Civilization, at least around the Mediterranean Sea. Because of this Rome could win even though it was as divided and polarized as present America. But because of its inner chaos the victory was not total. The Roman empire had to leave the Eastern part of the Hellenist world with one of the world's largest cities, Seleucia, to Parthia.  

 

Rome was initially not very benevolent, but as peace arrived, it became more popular: the ruthless exploitation of the provinces was reduced, and Roman rule began to benefit both culture and commercial activity in the Mediterranean area. Parthia won the East not least by applying philhellenic policies, i.e. being friend of Hellenism, thus benevolent. This as opposed to the intolerant preceding Seleucid state, whose brutality is illustrated in the Maccabean books. So we got two lasting universal states. Both empires continued for centuries.

 

In the following examples power was immense, but despite this a lack of perceived benevolence resulting not least from brutality contributed to the defeat of these powers.

 

2) Assyria, Second Mesopotamian Civilization 

For a couple of centuries Assyria dominated the modernity in this civilization. Through repeated invasions and cruelty most peoples were subdued. A major opposing power, Elam, was even obliterated in 645 BC. But in the end the accumulated hatred caused Assyria’s defeat in 612 BC, cf. the quote in the top. This hindered that Assyria became the creator of the universal state of this civilization. Instead, Cyrus the Great accomplished this in 539 BC not least thanks to his kindness and tolerance. His Persian Empire was to last for two centuries. 

 

3) Germany, present Global Civilization 

Although far more short-lived and less dominant Germany from roughly 1870 to 1945 can be compared with Assyria. It was very strong militarily, but it became hated and was defeated in the end. Like Assyria Germany did not become the unifier of its / our civilization. In the East Japan through its aggression and expansion became similarly hated, and in the end it got the same fate.

 

4) Qin, First Chinese Civilization 

Here we have another version. The less civilized state Qin dominated a large part of the First Chinese modernity. For a long time its power over the other countries was big, but limited because of its bad standing in public opinion. Later it increased its internal cohesion, consistency, military strength and brutality. It did manage to create the universal empire, but fell a few years later in rebellions against its oppression of peoples and culture.

 

Thus, Qin was first limited by its unpopularity. Increased power then overrode the bad PR, but in the end it was nevertheless defeated because of its hated cruelty. Instead, the much milder Liu Bang and his Han Dynasty took over. This dynasty lasted four centuries.

 

 

APPLICATION

As often said, America can not afford its present level of inner conflicts and inconsistent changing policies. As opposed to Rome two millennia ago it has powerful opponents. If the United States on top of this also begins to lose popularity by brutalizing the world, long term defeat is almost inevitable.

 

Together China and Russia can rival America in power, but presently they are lacking popular support in many countries. This can limit the expansion and the duration of their spheres. Public opinion does matter if one wants to invite friends and ultimately win the World. It is not enough to win support from autocratic leaders or people on the political fringes.

 

If America does not grow more unpopular in world public opinion in and beyond the Middle East, and if the Americans could overcome the internal divisions, their power and relative demographic youth could ensure them by far the largest empire with only small spheres left to China and Russia. But a continued polarization and not least the possible return of Donald Trump or the like will ruin these prospects. Instead the United States could face civil war.