Situation of Europe

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Save the EU !

 On September 2, 2016 I wrote the following in the post “Trump, Catiline, Russia, China and Parthia“

“Our version of a later not united post-chaotic world [= after modernity with its pluralism and internal and external conflicts] could perhaps be the world divided between 3 powers with each their sphere of interest. The United States and China dividing the Western civilization between each other. Each de facto cntrollng their parts. And Russia in a third sphere gradually becoming more culturally distinct and different from the rest.  But the way to this could be filled with trouble. Gradually though the three powers will calm [= subdue and conquer] their spheres of influence and agree on the borders between these spheres. At the end could come the global 

Pax Americana, Sinica et Russiana“

 

This is  still valid. We now know that Trump is not a modern incapable losing Catiline, but a winning overlord. The World is indeed developing into the three spheres as described in my recent posts. What I propose, is just to let this happen without too much conflict. This might be achieved via agreed borders between the three spheres. A such partitioning of the World can not be morally defended, but if the development into three all-encompassing empires is our destiny, then the road to this should be without too much conflict and suffering.

  

But, could the EU become it’s own independent sphere?

I have several times pointed to the unusually  long duration of modernity in the Second Chinese Civilisation (started around the Birth of Christ). See e.g. “Poles and Civilisations” from June 9, 2024. Here I will further elaborate this and draw parallels to present Europe.

 

We may set the beginning of  modernity in the Second Chinese Civilisation  to around AD 880 in connection with the great social conflicts at the end of the Tang Dynasty. China got split in minor states, but united in the Song Dynasty in 960. The two years would correspond to ca. 1800 and  1880 in our case and 320 and 240 BC in the Greco-Roman Civilisation. 

 

In1069 the great social reformer Wang Anshi entered the scene, corresponding to Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus in Rome from 133 BC. In our case Presidents Clinton and Obama from 1993. The three reformers tried to address the problems of respectively peasants, veterans and ordinary Americans without health insurance. Of course there were reforms earlier and later, but these three marked historical turns. 

 

As said in my recent posts, the Age of the Overlords started with Marius and Trump 2.0 ca. 104 BC and 2024, i.e. 30 years after the start of the reforms.

 

Translated into the timeline of our Second European Civilisation  Rome left modernity at ca. 2100. We will probably do it at the same time. China did not do it until the Mongol conquest in around 2200 on our timeline.

 

How come this long duration?!

 

It can perhaps be understood better, if we broaden the perspective on this civilisation  to encompass not only China, but the whole of East Asia.

Toynbee termed this the East Asian Civilisation .

 

Most often we have seen that all countries in a civilisation at the end of the phase of modernity become united = subdued or conquered by the leading power. But there are exceptions. In the First Mesopotamian Civilisation Hammurabi and his successors could not conquer the southern ‘Sealand’. And as said in ,Trump, Catiline, Russia, China and Parthia, Rome did not conquer the whole of the Greco-Roman Civilisation  as Parthia  remained a separate empire.

 

The crucial point is to realise that because a modernity ends at the “planned” time in parts of a civilisation , this does not have to be the case for not subdued countries. Thus, if Song China remained in the phase of modernity, this was not the case for the other parts of the East Asian Civilisation.

 

In China like in Rome and in our civilisation  the reformists were followed by the overlords.

Examples are the prime ministers Cai Jing, Qin Hui and Han Tuozhou. Also North China’s Jin Dynasty had it’s dominating personalities.  

 

After the defeat of Song to Jin in the battle at JXiangyang a in 1206, the two powers could have developed into two separate after-modern empires belonging to the same civilisation  in the style of Rome and Parthia. BUT soon after, the Mongols started to slaughterJin. AND Song managed to perpetuate the East Asian modernity for further seven decades. 

 

When we look back at the century following the reforms, Song China like Rome had the mentioned overlords with dictatorial power, but they only ruled for limited periods. Like in Rome and present America, the executive power was strengthened, e.g. through the use of decrees, called directed edicts. But these developments did not accelerate like they did in Rome. 

 

 

Coupled to the EU

If the EU survives as a major player on the world scene, it could potentially assume a role similar to that of Song China.

 

In my post from January 5, 2014 “The European Sung Dynasty” I indeed compared the present EU with China in the Song Dynasty. Can we do the same, conserve an island of modernity and reason while the rest of the world becomes part of empires under de facto emperors?

 

That depends.

 

Modernity in Song survived because of

a} Internal political developments, not least the political Neo-Confucian Daoxue-party.

On the international level it survived for decades because of three factors:

 

b} Inner cohesion despite the political pluralism.

c} A GDP which when we look at the economy beyond basic agriculture and crafts, was absolutely overwhelming, not only in East Asia, but in the whole World.

d} A military strength which contrary to my comments in 2014 was considerable. It managed to hold the Mongols back during five decades of invasion attempts.

 

Now, can the EU match these four conditions?

a} We have no such thing as Neo-Confucianism . Rather, because of uncontrolled immigration and a division between elites and people feeling left out, we see a turn to the political extremes.

b} Therefore, cohesion in and between the member-countries is being eroded.

c} The GDP of the EU is limited compared to the rest of the civilisation.

d} The EU is militarily week and depends on America. Just spending more money will not change this in a union without cohesion, dynamics and centralised government and without a united integrated military command structure. 

 

These points are obvious to everyone. The comparison with the corresponding points from the Song Dynasty is depressing for Europe. If we don’t change our corse radically, the EU will be lost. Greenland is just the first step.

Perhaps we should reverse the roles and invite Canada to join our union. 

 

 

 

Further comments

  

1} There can be more than one overlord from the same power and even from the same political side. Presently, Elon Musk begins to act like a second US overlord  alongside Donald Trump. Musk’s treatment of politicians in allied countries shows which arrogance we can expect from overlords.

 

2} Deals can be made between “triumvirs” from all big powers. But unfortunately for America, deals between the leaders of the opposing political sides within the country seem less likely.

 

3} Of course, in a not completely segregated world, superpowers can be part of the economic and IT- spheres of each other.

 

4} If you squeeze a block of rubber for decades, it will rebound.

 

If you put seeds in a concrete confinement, they will break the concrete.

 

If you enter the territory of the dominant alpha male, you will be expelled.

 

Sphere of what?

  

I have often used the concept “sphere of interest”. When I talk about dividing the world between the big powers or rather their overlords or triumvirs, the term must be nuanced considerably. We can differentiate between several types or levels or fields of interest. At least these four could be mentioned:

 

1} Sphere of economic interest.

This involves markets, investments, outsourcing of production, division of labour, exchange of raw materials etc. For a given superpower or its leader, a such sphere presently can encompass large parts of the world.

 

2} Sphere of IT infrastructure.

Partly also of IT software and hardware.

 

3} Sphere of political dominance.

 This ranges from political influence to outright overlordship.

 

4} Sphere of military presence.

 

Clearly, the geographical size of the spheres decreases from 1} to 4}. Both the spheres of economy and IT can be large. Depending on the degree of decoupling or derisking, the spheres of these types can overlap considerably, e.g. a country in South America can be economically interesting for both the United States and China. Obviously, such overlapping is not the case for the spheres of political overrule and military presence.

 

Many conflicts between big powers arise from disputes over the demarkations or borders between the sphere of interest in these four fields. As said in the previous post, it could bring a certain stability if the small and medium size countries in important parts of the world are distributed between the superpowers, and this happens along clearly defined demarkation lines, agreed upon by these powers.

 

As we have at least four fields, there must be agreement on a division line in each. Unless the decoupling is total, the spheres in the four fields should not coincide geographically. In this case the borders between the resulting super-spheres would be almost impossible to agree upon. Because one country is a part of the economic sphere of one power it does not have to be also politically dominated.

 

To conclude, in order to stabilise the globe, it can be divided into spheres on several levels, e.g. economy, IT, politics and military, and the demarkation lines between these spheres, i.e. which countries “belong to” which of the major players can be different on each level.

 

 

Wellcome back, Mr. Trump

Welcome back, Mr. Trump

Wellcome to The Age of the Overlords

 

As often said, in our civilisation we are approaching the point, where politics per se looses its importance. Ultimately, perhaps around 2100, politics on the large scale will be replaced by imperial one man-rule. Politics and democracy will continue only on the small scale in the form of handling local practical matters.

 

During a modernity, e.g. in the Greco-Roman Civilisation ca. 350 - 30 BC, in our case 1776 - 2100, politics has an extreme importance. Passionate, often aggressive and violent fights about ideas on how to build society and distribute wealth dominate. Political parties canalise these ideas. In contrast, before and after this stage politics, if we insist on using this term, is primarily a fight for power.

 

In the latest century of a modernity, politics is transformed from a mature stage to the declined stage of late modernity. This happens through three substages replacing each other, but partly overlapping:

 

In the first substage, we see a simplification and polarisation of politics combined with strong emotions. At the same time, the wish for personal power of some of the leading politicians gains in importance.

In our Second European Civilisation we entered this period around 2000. In Rome it started with the Gracchus brothers around 135 BC. In both cases there were clear warning signs already in the decade before.

 

Gradually, the trend towards personal power becomes pervasive for the leaders of political parties. The public debate may still think that it is only about politics per se, but voters are more and more focusing on and following charismatic and dominating leaders. The political and personal passions become immense.

 

In the second substage politics is more and more reduced to a simple often violent fight for personal power. We are presently taking the first steps into this period. In Rome it started around 104 BC. Trough this substage the focus on politics as such falls to zero. First, politics becomes a mere tool for the rulers. It then turns into blatant bribery of their followers.

 

But on the political scene the beginning of substage 2 may not look very different from the end of substage 1. The crucial qualitative difference is the emergence of rulers with clearly increased executive power. This is often accompanied by supporting thoughts as in our case Project 2025. This executive power soon develops into dictatorship. Also in Rome, corresponding thoughts were used to justify dictatorship.

 

In the third substage which in reality is for ever, one leader wins imperial rule.

 

As said, the Roman republic entered the first substage of polarisation and simplification with the Gracchus brothers around 135 BC and the second substage with the absolute rule of Marius 104. In our case the years are ca. 2000 and 2025 respectively.

 

The two so-called triumvirates from ca. 60 to 30 BC showed that politics had been replaced with a fight between leaders. As everybody knows, the triumvirates were personal deals between competing leading men who divided responsibilities and territories between each other. These arrangements secured coexistence and peace for some time before conflicts arose again.

 

The time of the triumvirates is generally seen as the transition from politics to the emperors. You can see this substage as the end-fight for power of the Greco-Roman Civilisation. In the Roman republic this substage started with the dictatorships of the ‘Democrat’ Marius and the ‘Republican’ Sulla 104-79. These two powerful men did not reach the triumvirate solution of dividing their world between them, probably because of the chaotic nature of their civilisation. But they nevertheless personally ruled their world. The well-known triumvirates per se started a little later. In our case the deals between competing men are likely to start already early in the substage, that is not long from now.

.

 

In many civilisations the end-fight runs between the leaders of powerful nations. This was the case in the in the First Mesopotamian, the First Chinese and the Second Indian Civilisation just to mention a few. The Roman Republic won most of the area of the Greco-Roman Civilisation before the end-fight began. Therefore, this fight was not between nations, but between leaders in one nation, i.e. the triumvirs.

 

Generalised, we may call the leaders in the substage / end-fight overlords and call the period The Age of the Overlords no matter if they are one, two, three or more and no matter if they belong to one or more nations.

 

In our case things are complicated. On the one hand we do have our own Rome in the form of America which has a dominating power in the world. On the other hand, its power is not as totally dominating as Rome’s was. This means that in our Second European Civilisation the overlords or triumvirs can both be leaders of strong world powers like China, Russia and America AND leaders of the parties IN the latter.

 

As said, we are presently entering this Age of the Overlords. Donald Trump is an overlord. But such leaders do not have to be new persons entering the competition between overlords. It is the nature of politics and political constellations which change. This furthers the dominance of men focussed on their own power like Donald Trump and Julius Caesar. Leaders from before the period can continue to rule, but they will be drawn into this new type of power-play.

 

Still, the old type of leaders may find it difficult to understand and adapt to the new type of rulers. More and more, leaders of not only Republicans, but also of Democrats and the leaders of the world powers will be of the new type.

 

What characterises this new type of leaders is not necessarily a lack of long-term strategy. Rather, it is a lack of respect for and obligation toward ideologies, established policies, rules and traditions. This concerns their own parties and their voters who will just endorse everything their beloved leader does no matter if it goes against ideas which he had yesterday. It also concerns the ‘deep state’ which is a barrier against the personal will of the leader and must be broken down. Finally, the disrespect of traditions and obligations greatly affects foreign relations. Long standing formal alliances like NATO are no longer seen as holy and can be ended anytime. Obviously, the same is the case for international treaties and agreements. And not least, alliances with other big powers or rather their leaders can easily be started or ended. Often, relations between triumvirs do not last forever.

 

Of course, academics and politicians stuck in the old way of thinking from mature modernity before 2000 will lament this. They try to ‘correct’ the ‘wrong’ course. But they must adapt to the new time or be marginalised and ignored. Zeitgeist has changed. In the old optics the acts of the new type of leaders may look unpredictable and therefore erratic. But these changing acts can also be seen as pragmatic. Old frozen ideologies and conflicts and even a war may be ended in this way.

 

It is like cutting Gordian Knots instead of untangling them.

 

In the best case, the upcoming new conditions could bring a certain global détente. A negotiated well-defined partitioning of spheres of interest in crucial parts of the world between the overlords could mean stability for some time.

 

In this way, the new conditions lamented by some could have the potential to benefit humankind.

 

So

Wellcome back, Mr. Trump.