Trump, Catiline, Russia, China and Parthia

Because somebody is a contributor to the acceleration of the general slide towards political decline, it does not automatically imply that this person is the best able to navigate in the troubled waters he stirs up. Maybe he is just of the same limited abilities as one of the Roman predecessors, Catiline. In the first century BC this man tried to seize power as the head of a third force outside the two big political parties, the Peoples Party and the Optimates. Just like Trump is trying now. He contributed to the chaos leading to further civil wars. But he failed in his plans.

In the short term Trump could loose or win the elections. But he will certainly accelerate the World slipping into a new unpredictable era ruled by the personal will of populist leaders. If he is not able to understand or navigate in the new world, other more able leaders will reap the harvest.

So you do not have to be good at navigating in a declined world, just because you embody this dcline. On the other hand you do not have to be declined yourself to have this ability.

No matter who will win the American presidential elections we may as well prepare for the coming post-stable era. An era which could last from a half up to a whole century.

The fueling of the new cold war between NATO and Russia may prove to be a wrong priority for the western countries. The internal lines behind the front could be crumbling as populists and populism gain power and influence. In the short and possibly intermediate term they may have other agendas than to have conflicts with Russia.

The focus can later turn back against Russia with sudden changes of mood. But for now it may be safer for the West to withdraw from expansion and military building up and instead just concentrate on keeping in order the results of the already big earlier expansions after the breakup of the Soviet Union.

But in the long term the tensions between East and West are likely to reemerge. It is remarkable how longstanding and deep this conflict seems to be. With short interruptions it has lasted since the 16th century. And in contrast to now long time forgotten conflicts between countries like Germany and France it has risen again even recently. This could be a sign of a deeply rooted opposition between two fundamentally different civilizations. As such it may resurface from time to time alongside shifting alliances.


Earlier civilizations hav most often at the end of their modernity reached a condition with a de facto emperor (no matter the title) with dictatorial status at the head of all the countries in the civilization. Rome, Qin, Babylonia, Aztecs. I have earlier written that the amount of chaos that is possible to sustain or can be afforded in the leading power with ambition to subdue the rest, depends on the strength of the others. In old China the other powers were for a long time strong. This necessitated an extremely strong centralization and degree of order in the winning power Qin. In old Rome the other countries were powerless afther Hannibal. Therefore the Romans could afford an extreme degree of internal chaos. I have also written that the Americans are in an intermediate position between these extremes. They cannot afford a degree of chaos on the level of old Rome. That is for the Americans the danger that comes from types like Danald Trump. A more organized and stable China could win.

But will our world ever get united under one power?

The competitors are clearly China and the United States. Russia is for the time being on the defensive, at least globally seen. When looking at predecessor-civilizations we see a couple of examples of modernities not ending with a united world. In the first Mesopotamian civilization Hammurabi and his first successors did not succeed in conquering the southern Sealand. The Oriental world was still disunited under the Seldjuks. These deviations from the general rule had their specific reasons. In our case main reasons would be the cost and dangers of modern wars or even conflicts disrupting global trade.

Concerning Rome we nay learn from a broadened perspective. Rome never conquered the whole known world. The Parthian Empire was a very near and ever-present neighbor, and it was very able to resist. In fact the two reached a balance of power. Perhabs Parthia could have been conquered if the Romans had had a lesser degree of internal strife.

Also, Parthia was not a completely different world. Both empires were culturally largely Hellenistic. Parthia gradually became more Orientalized, but so did Rone. In many ways it could have been a natural end to sbsume all Hellenistic parts of the world from Gibraltar to the Indus under one power; the chaos in Rome may have been the factor stopping this development.

Our version of a later not united post-chaotic world could perhaps be the world divided between 3 powers with each their sphere of interest. The United States and China dividing the Western civilization between each other. Each de facto cntrollng their parts. And Russia in a third sphere gradually becomming more culturally distinct and different from the rest.

But the way to this could be filled with trouble. Gradually though the three powers will calm their spheres of influence and agree on the borders between these spheres. At the end could come the global

Pax Americana, Sinica et Russiana

Parties become groups of followers

This was predicted by Spengler 100 years ago. In the last century of a modernity the political parties are gradually being transformed into groups of followers used as tools by single persons. A party has a program, a group of followers has a leader.

In the northern rich world we have already for a long time seen that political parties become more and more person-focused. Their leaders acting like superstars and the parties gaining votes as a function of this. But this never removed the role of programmatic political views. This has changed definitively for the new populist parties, often on the right wing. These are often a strong leader surrounded by "village fools".

And now most of the leaders of the Grand Old Party has been reduced to a group of followers. Surrounding and flattering their presidential candidate in the hope of getting high posts no matter the political principles. The long standing obstructionism in Congress was already a clear sign of the political decline. But it was still politically motivated. Now the only motive seems to be personal power. This is the end point of the political decline in  late modernity which the Western civilization is entering.

The building up of NATO in Eastern Europe is a misguided and hawkish brick, reestablishing the Iron Curtain further to the east. But the talk by Mr. Trump of no longer garantying the security of for example the Baltic states must awake horror in NATO and in the US institutions established for securing America and its power in the world. Another reason why the support for Trump from leading Republicans is so incredible.

In principle a stable end predictable world order is preferable. But only for big players with an equal balance of power between them. Since the break up of the USSR this equal balance has been altered, Russia being pushed back very far toward Moscow. No wonder that Putin is no fan of a stability as is looks presently. NATO's recent expansionist behavior has just added to this. For subdued powers an unstable world order ruled by the will of single leaders is preferable to an unequal stability.

But seen from Washington as the capital of a superpower the Republicans under Donald Trump must look like a security risk.

Turkey between civilizations

Of course everybody must condemn the failed coup attempt in Turkey. But the event will probably be used by Erdogan to start persecutions of both people involved in the attempt plus all other real and supposed opponents of the autocrat. Persecutions possibly on a scale and severity that may make some wish that the coup had succeeded. And make broader parts of the military wish they had participated.

Like other populists Erdogan appeals to hitherto marginalized parts of the population. People who have not followed the establishments modernization in mentality, culture and education. Like Erdogan so Trump, Le Pen, Orbán etc. but in Turkey this is complicated by the division caused by the westernization of the originally Oriental civilization introduced by Ataturk. This westernization only really transformed a part of the population. The other large part stayed more Oriental. But for decades they submitted as a passive silent marginalized half. With the AKP and Erdogan they have woken and gained a voice. Unlike elsewhere, in addition to the division between established and marginalized people comes the division between civilizations, between westernized parts of society and the remnants of the Oriental civilization. Like elsewhere in the Middle East these remnants struggle to resist the assimilation into the dominating Western civilization. The difference in civilization makes the division in Turkish society and the return of the marginalized more dangerous than the division between the establishment and its opponents in Europe and America.

Before these developments Turkey was a block of stability and approaching a modern democracy mature for EU-membership. Beginning to overcome the old divisions through room for pluralism of different people within the same society. A uniting party like the HDP was a product of this development. But Erdogan has ended this. He stirs up polarization and animosity. Between modernists and traditionalists, between westernized and Oriental, between Turks and Kurds.

After 1850 Turkey has gone through terrible phases of Ethnic cleansing of the type typical for the Oriental world under change from its old patchwork-nations to coherent western type territorial states. This seemed to be finally reaching its end with a pluralistic democracy being approached. But with the reappearing polarization and the coming to power of representatives of the marginalized more Oriental part of the population now beyond influence from the other half, it can be feared that forms of ethnic cleansing like pressure for assimilation may return. The secular parts as well as the sum of all parts of Turkey was on a stage after ethnic cleansing. The more Oriental part may not be. First affected are the Kurds and then perhaps the Alevis?

In sum Turkey risks disintegrating along lines of politics, civilization and ethnicity.

Miscellaneous comments

Every time the United States enters a Middle Eastern country militarily it will evoke so much opposition and set free so much latent tension that the US will have to stay to keep enemies, chaos and terrorists under control.

Afghanistan and Iraq can not be left again. They like future cases are de facto American colonies.


The improved relations between Turkey and both Israel and Russia are good examples of future foreign relations, opportunistic and personalized.
You are enemies till you suddenly become friends.
You have a friend till you break up.
You have a point of view till you take another.


Some Republican members of Congress want Hillary Clinton brought before court because of the email-affair in order to help a clown to gain the presidency. With such a level of politics the Unites States can only become the greatest country on an earth void of real adversaries.

Step by step

England and Wales have voted to leave the EU. This is just one more sign of the decline of the old world order. It is one event in a chain of previous and future signs of a continuing chain of such events. That Mr. Trump has managed to come as far as he is now is another. At the same time such events are contributing to an acceleration of this decline. Trump as candidate for the "GOP" and the Brexit are two of the hitherto perhaps most important events of this kind. Two big steps among many smaller and bigger.

We may have reached a point of no return in the development of our modernity and our civilization. This Western modernity has seen the most cruel mass scale violence in world history, only approached by the first Chinese modernity in the Warring States period ca. 500 - 221 BC. But it has in its mature stage in the second half of the last century - at least in the northern hemisphere - also seen perhaps the most intelligent and balanced intra- and interstate policies in history, only paralleled by the second Chinese modernity in the Song Dynasty (960-1279).

Our case could have been the first and only possibility in the chain of big civilizations to break the pattern of modernities turning more and more chaotic and thereby necessitating a caesarian dictatorship. Through an immense historical knowledge and intelligence among historians, men of culture and science and politicians there was a theoretical chance of avoiding this destiny in our case, the Western Civilization.

The last century of modernities has in most predecessors been one of increasing chaos dominating more and more. That we have entered this phase has become threateningly clear in the 4 years gone by since I started this blog. Now it looks enevitable. We and the politicians should be prepared for a new world with new rules.

Of course different countries will follow the decline with different speeds. Small countries like in Scandinavia and the Benelux could quickly become banana republics. Southern Europe is also far on the way. The UK is the first major north  European country to go this far. Not only in the form of the result of the vote, but also in the low level of the political process and the role of UKIP. Other major players are clearly infected both in the form of new populists and in the form of populist policies from grand old parties. It looks as if the development is unstopable. At best it can be postponed. As said earlier Germany and China could be the most resilient bigger countries.

 That the  old world order was stable and rule-governed is not the same as to say that every power felt it to be just. For such countries any change may seem favorable. But the present change is not primarily one affecting the balance of power. It is one of changed or rather disappearing rules for behavior.

And the cause? Spengler would call the decline of modernities an intrinsic and inevitable element in the development of civilizations. Toynbee would admit that the development has characterized all previous civilization, but nevertheless has a cause. Which? Put in a very generalized form it may be:

The return of the margins or the marginalized.

Two versions:
1) Semi-barbarians from the border zones (Qin, Seldjuks, Aztecs etc.).
2) Internally marginalized people resenting an old "establissement". In Rome proletarians entering the legions, veterans etc. In the Song Dynasty we saw protests against the globalization reaching from Kaifeng to Bagdad.


Today millions of people feel threatened seeing their old industrial centers dying in competition from new technologies and global trade. Feeling humiliated by mega-cities and their condescending elites and politicians. Often threatened by social decline or badly educated, on low wages or social wellfare. Some living in depopulated areas loosing their young to the cities. Giving foreigners the blame, Moslems East Europeans, Hispanics, the EU, whoever.

These people feeling stigmatized as losers now take revenge by supporting populists who use them and their anger. This is the other way anti-civilized marginal forces return. Of course the establishments are not innocent. The marginalization of large segments of society is a major cause.

Contagion

The danger for democracy seems to be growing globally. In the developed world especially right wing populists gain increasing support. This is obvious for everybody. This leads to either opportunistic malfunctioning government or autocratic rule or both. And the remedy to control this would also be reduced democracy.

Just one more example of the development will be if Austria elects a racist president.

A crucial difference from the thirties in the last century is that the turn away from democracy then was the result of economic hardship. Today it comes from a general political decline. Voters and many politicians seem not to know and care enough for mature democracy. Of course people havingn lost their economic foundation are especially easy prey for demagogues, but the trend is mainstream.

Also worrying is the corresponding development in the less developped world. Here democracy has only been achieved over the last decades. But already now the trend seems to be reversing in some countries. Turkey is clearly moving back to authoritarian rule. The Philippines have chosen a man directly praising dictatorship and violence. Brazil is especially worrying. The chaos in this big and important country could also lead to a new dictatorship. One could fear that more countries in the less developed world could follow a similar path away from their short-lived democracy.

Obviously lack of long democratic tradition and economic problems can contribute to accelerating the process. But without the global trend so clear in the Northern hemisphere it would not be so ominous. As long as we had functioning mature democracies and not least the consensus that this was the ideal, there existed a colossal pressure on the southern hemisphere to try to reach the same level and ideal.

With types like the often mentioned Trump, Orbán, Kaczyński, Le Pen, Erdogan etc. in the north there is not much good example and ideal left, not any longer a consensus about a stable and responsible democratic government, to press the southern world to achieve, develop and maintain democracy.

As said earlier a stable democracy can only exist as long as the populations are guided by responsible politicians and media. When this guidance is don by the internet, mob rulers and populist demagogues a vicious downward spiral can start. And the contamination spreads.

Diplomacy or personal will

The liberation of Palmyra is just one of the results of the new constructive cooperation between Russia and the United States over Syria. This cooperation is an example of the still surviving elements of the stable old world order, which resulted from mutually recognized spheres of interest and rules for behavior: A moderated proxy war in the third world, pressure and strong statements from both sides, but de facto ignoring hysterical reactions in the press and above all patient step by step diplomatic activity. Much of the same elements also characterized the way to the brilliant nuclear deal with Iran. 

But we may now be entering the era of the Erdogans, Orbáns, Trumps and Le Pens with all the shortsightedness and inconsistency that this implies. With such people as leaders it could be easier  to strike a deal here and now without long negotiations. But it is equally easy to have misnderstandings and sudden changes of minds and policies being determined by personal animosities. The foreign policy of the Western democratic powers with their frequent changes of leaders could become especially inconsistent in such a declined political culture. 

The time of long term international stability could be replaced by lability based on transient changes of mood in the leaders and in the populations, the media and not least in the Internet.

The Greco-Roman world around 100 BC went through a similar transition. Instead of conflicts, wars and treaties between political parties with ideologies and between countries came power struggles and private deals between dominating men as so clearly seen in the triumvirates. Similar developments took place in other civilizations in the last century of their modernities. Just look at the Oriental world in the 11th century where the emerging sultans had a role corresponding to that of the triumvirs. We too are entering the time of the triumvirs. Sudden deals between leaders, sudden disruption of ties, sudden adventures.

In Rome because of the total dominance of this single power the triumvirs were all from the state of Rome. In our case they will be leaders from different big powers.

Stable longterm international relations could gradually become replaced by private deals and breaks between single leaders of the big powers.

Already before this phase we see international politics being disturbed by immature traits apparent in the eastward political and military expansion of NATO and the EU. And the 2014 Russian answer in the form of the ntevention in Eastern Ukraine. Such acts are unnecessary, insensitive and breaking the rules of avoiding provocations. The planned NATO missile shield mostly based in Eastern Europe is the continuation of these insensitive acts.

Such behaviors represent the often mentioned general political decline, here also manifesting itself in international politics.

Another result of this decline in foreign politics is a disappearance of the border between diplomacy and the media and in general the public opinion. The populist leaders merge with and lead the public opinion in their transient moods, and worse, the diplomatic activity will no longer have the freedom from interference needed to reach balanced solutions. The leaders and media will not distinguish between 1) symbolic power demonstrations or mere signals and 2) real threats or problems. What used to be semi-conflicts or games in preparation of and as part of diplomacy, will be perceived as serious threats or provocations demanding immediate action, not only as hitherto by the press, but also by the leaders.

Signals will be confused with reality.

The next step is the full transformation from foreign policies being governed by strategic thinking and diplomacy to a policy determined by the personal will of the rulers. The era of higher forms of foreign policies could sooner or later come to an end. 

Of course the impact of the will of leaders can be partly absorbed by the political and legal system in countries and unions where the power of the leader is clearly limited. But 1) in some countries like Hungary or Turkey these limits are being removed, and 2) where they are not, like in the case of the EU the political decline leads to the impossibility of making decisions.

In powers where the leader already has a constitutionally based strong influence on foreign policies like the United States, Russia and France, the impact from future presidents making personalized foreign politics will be immediate and strong. The emerging inconsistent personalized international relations can become a nightmare for experienced diplomats.