Efficient Rule

  

  

Every country needs efficient rule. This is especially important for nations in competition for power with others. It decides which nation is strongest. How this efficacy is achieved is dependent on things like culture, world location, degree of development and above all historical phase. I have earlier talked about how rule changes or should change as the political decline progresses. But I have not been sufficiently clear. In the following I will focus on developed countries. I will relate efficient rule to three phases of politics during mature and late modernity. In order to gain an understandable generalized overview over this vast and complicated topic things will be somewhat simplified. I will not burden the reader with historical examples, just say that the models serving as basis primarily are the modernities in the Greco-Roman and the First and Second Chinese Civilizations supplemented with extrapolations of our own modernity.

 

Modernities, in our case from ca 1800 to 2100, can be divided into three overall phases: a) Early, b) Mature and c) Late or declining modernity. A decline of politics characterizes the last of these phases. The degree of maturity in the second phase depends on which civilization we look at. The Second Chinese Civilization and the present global Second European Civilization have reached the highest levels, in our case perhaps 1900-2000, some countries from 1945.

 

During early modernity we had unbalanced relations between societal and political groupings resulting in conflicts and revolutions. This was gradually stabilized during the following phase of political maturity. It happened through an absolutely crucial partitioning of power. This was both between different institutionalized powers like courts, lawmaking and governments and between representations of different classes and interest-groups. Groups without representation were also involved in the shaping of laws. The balancing of society and the political system happened both through institutional balances / checks and through political surveillance of governments from oppositions and public opinion. You could say that the pluralism of societies was accommodated by making sure that institutions and politics mirrored the societal pluralism: rule itself was pluralistic i.e. collective.

 

This could be implemented through western representational democracy where the different societal groups elected and were guided by their political parties. But political pluralism could also be achieved in other ways, e.g. through one-party collective leaderships.

 

These systems functioned relatively well, but only as long as society and politics were mature. What this means is easier to see when we look at the following post-mature phase of declining late modernity.

 

The French philosopher Lyotard and others have suggested that we are entering a “postmodern” time, where belief in the political and religious ideologies disappear. But this vision mostly fits the intellectual elites and is a far too simple picture. Politics is certainly not dead yet. Neither is modernity.

 

We can divide late modernity and its political development into two sub-phases:

 

1) The present extreme polarization of societies and politics. It is not postmodern in the sense of lost interest in politics. As described in my earlier posts, politics becomes very simplified, but political (and religious) interest is not reduced. On the contrary, it is immensely increased and affects almost all. Even the once self-declared “postmodern” intellectuals become re-politicized and participate in the shitstorms. Every citizen and politician repeat the same predictable stereotypical extreme arguments and counter-arguments. People are no longer guided by responsible parties, but become puppets of the extreme opinions of other people and demagogues.

 

2) It is not until the second sub-phase of late modernity that interest in politics per se begins to disappear. But it is not replaced by a postmodern indifference. Meanings are as strong as before, but now they are no longer about the choice of policy. Instead the question is which person should be the ruler of one or more nations. Politics may be used as an argument, but both politics and parties are reduced to mere tools for power-hungry personalities. Rudiments of this are visible already now, but we have not yet arrived in this sub-phase.

 

That late modernity has this division into the two sub-phases, implies two different answers to what efficient rule is, one for each sub-phase. In the present polarized sub-phase the division or rupture of society has risen to levels which must be controlled. This can happen through a continuation of the pluralistic rule from mature modernity, but with the crucial difference, that it must now be authoritarian. In mature modernity societal and political diversities were accommodated. In the present first sub-phase of late modernity they must be controlled. Pluralistic rule must absolutely be continued, but with a reduction of influence of the political extremes. In two- or multiparty countries this implies that the center-oriented parts of the main political parties together exert a mildly authoritarian power. The political parties should be freed of influence of radicals. Formal power can shift between the parties via elections, but they should agree on important basics. Parties at the extremes must similarly be controlled, but not be outlawed. Angry people should be guided, but they need to have a voice. No attempt to crush them can succeed. The internet must be partly controlled to make sure that the angry voices and their fake news don’t get echoed and amplified and propagated.

 

In America this would mean that moderate Republicans and moderate Democrats de facto get rid of or better subdue their extreme wings and make an implicit alliance, which despite nominal elections controls society and politics in a moderately authoritarian manner. Obviously, a development like this is very unlikely in the United States. It may be too late now where the extremists in the GOP are taking over the party.

 

In one-party ruled countries the pluralistic authoritarian rule can naturally be in continuation of the collective rule of mature modernity.

 

 I repeat, in the present polarized first sub-phase of late modernity nations must still be ruled collectively in one- or multiparty conditions as they were in the preceding mature phase. But in order to ensure a degree of cohesion and inner and outer strength a certain degree of authoritarian rule is necessary. Here it is very important to distinguish between a) collective authoritarian rule and b) autocratic one-man rule. As long as societies and leaders are focused on politics and are divided and polarized, it is necessary that governance should encompass different opinions. Even though the extremes must be subdued, there should be a pluralistic/collective rule by people representing a certain width of diverging views. It is too narrow if only one person decides. In that case important societal and political forces are kept out of influence. This will result in counter-pressure, unrest, destabilization and sudden changes of power. 

 

Our goal in the present difficult times of trouble must be to keep our countries as stable as possible as long as possible through a measured control. The alternative is internal and external chaos and widespread suffering which will add to the effects of climate change. 

 

It is not until the last sub-phase of declining modernity where interest in politics per se disappears, that autocratic one-man rule can succeed and ultimately - in the universal empire after the end of modernity - become a lasting solution. One ruler can only hope to represent whole society, when politics is dead.

 

How to win the World - and lose it again

  

 

Nineveh, you have been hurt badly, and nothing can heal your wound. Everyone who hears the news of your destruction claps their hands. They are all happy, because they all felt the pain you caused again and again.

 

The prophet Nahum (3:19) on the fall of the Assyrian capital Nineveh.

 

As often said, the present Second European, now global Civilization is now in the late part of its modernity. This is a phase where few remaining big powers fight to gain control over the nations and create a universal state. In many earlier civilizations this endfight has been decided militarily. Because such a fight on the big scale today would be suicidal, we will rather see confrontations in other spheres. The internet will be the battlefield both in the form of direct cyber-warfare implying attacks on essential infrastructure etc. and a more subtle manipulation and competition to win support from the world’s public opinion. Because large scale military confrontations are excluded (as we must hope) and a direct cyber-attack on a superpower and its closest allies in present doctrines are viewed as a casus belli, hybrid internet-warfare and competition for sympathy will be of the utmost importance in deciding which power will take over the world: Minor powers can be convinced politically or economically or be bribed or persuaded to enter the sphere of a superpower, especially if this is perceived as benevolent. 

 

Even though direct internet-attacks from an opposing superpower against smaller powers allied to a superpower can cause war, this is not the case for cyber-attacks or pressure from a superpower on its own allies or on weak nations. Europe and Latin America should be prepared.

 

The importance of good PR has existed in the endfight in all civilizations, even the most militarily violent. In the following I will use examples from earlier civilizations to illustrate the balance between a) force and b) perceived benevolence. With “force” I mean things like military might, political coercion, economic pressure and presently cyber-attacks on essential services.

 

Obviously, the perceived benevolence or popularity of a major power has an inverse relation to its use of force, but it depends on numerous factors. These include propaganda and the unpopularity of opposing superpowers. It is also important to notice that the two factors, force and benevolence should be applied not in an erratic manner, but consistently as part of c) a longer term strategy.

 

 

MODELS AND EXAMPLES

Good models for our present endfight are the Greco-Roman Civilization, the Second Mesopotamian Civilization and the First Chinese Civilization. 

 

1) Rome, Greco-Roman Civilization 

The easiest example is if there is only one superpower and it only has weak opponents. Especially after the fall of Cartage around 200 BC Rome was in this position in the endfight in the Greco-Roman Civilization, at least around the Mediterranean Sea. Because of this Rome could win even though it was as divided and polarized as present America. But because of its inner chaos the victory was not total. The Roman empire had to leave the Eastern part of the Hellenist world with one of the world's largest cities, Seleucia, to Parthia.  

 

Rome was initially not very benevolent, but as peace arrived, it became more popular: the ruthless exploitation of the provinces was reduced, and Roman rule began to benefit both culture and commercial activity in the Mediterranean area. Parthia won the East not least by applying philhellenic policies, i.e. being friend of Hellenism, thus benevolent. This as opposed to the intolerant preceding Seleucid state, whose brutality is illustrated in the Maccabean books. So we got two lasting universal states. Both empires continued for centuries.

 

In the following examples power was immense, but despite this a lack of perceived benevolence resulting not least from brutality contributed to the defeat of these powers.

 

2) Assyria, Second Mesopotamian Civilization 

For a couple of centuries Assyria dominated the modernity in this civilization. Through repeated invasions and cruelty most peoples were subdued. A major opposing power, Elam, was even obliterated in 645 BC. But in the end the accumulated hatred caused Assyria’s defeat in 612 BC, cf. the quote in the top. This hindered that Assyria became the creator of the universal state of this civilization. Instead, Cyrus the Great accomplished this in 539 BC not least thanks to his kindness and tolerance. His Persian Empire was to last for two centuries. 

 

3) Germany, present Global Civilization 

Although far more short-lived and less dominant Germany from roughly 1870 to 1945 can be compared with Assyria. It was very strong militarily, but it became hated and was defeated in the end. Like Assyria Germany did not become the unifier of its / our civilization. In the East Japan through its aggression and expansion became similarly hated, and in the end it got the same fate.

 

4) Qin, First Chinese Civilization 

Here we have another version. The less civilized state Qin dominated a large part of the First Chinese modernity. For a long time its power over the other countries was big, but limited because of its bad standing in public opinion. Later it increased its internal cohesion, consistency, military strength and brutality. It did manage to create the universal empire, but fell a few years later in rebellions against its oppression of peoples and culture.

 

Thus, Qin was first limited by its unpopularity. Increased power then overrode the bad PR, but in the end it was nevertheless defeated because of its hated cruelty. Instead, the much milder Liu Bang and his Han Dynasty took over. This dynasty lasted four centuries.

 

 

APPLICATION

As often said, America can not afford its present level of inner conflicts and inconsistent changing policies. As opposed to Rome two millennia ago it has powerful opponents. If the United States on top of this also begins to lose popularity by brutalizing the world, long term defeat is almost inevitable.

 

Together China and Russia can rival America in power, but presently they are lacking popular support in many countries. This can limit the expansion and the duration of their spheres. Public opinion does matter if one wants to invite friends and ultimately win the World. It is not enough to win support from autocratic leaders or people on the political fringes.

 

If America does not grow more unpopular in world public opinion in and beyond the Middle East, and if the Americans could overcome the internal divisions, their power and relative demographic youth could ensure them by far the largest empire with only small spheres left to China and Russia. But a continued polarization and not least the possible return of Donald Trump or the like will ruin these prospects. Instead the United States could face civil war.