Efficient Rule

  

  

Every country needs efficient rule. This is especially important for nations in competition for power with others. It decides which nation is strongest. How this efficacy is achieved is dependent on things like culture, world location, degree of development and above all historical phase. I have earlier talked about how rule changes or should change as the political decline progresses. But I have not been sufficiently clear. In the following I will focus on developed countries. I will relate efficient rule to three phases of politics during mature and late modernity. In order to gain an understandable generalized overview over this vast and complicated topic things will be somewhat simplified. I will not burden the reader with historical examples, just say that the models serving as basis primarily are the modernities in the Greco-Roman and the First and Second Chinese Civilizations supplemented with extrapolations of our own modernity.

 

Modernities, in our case from ca 1800 to 2100, can be divided into three overall phases: a) Early, b) Mature and c) Late or declining modernity. A decline of politics characterizes the last of these phases. The degree of maturity in the second phase depends on which civilization we look at. The Second Chinese Civilization and the present global Second European Civilization have reached the highest levels, in our case perhaps 1900-2000, some countries from 1945.

 

During early modernity we had unbalanced relations between societal and political groupings resulting in conflicts and revolutions. This was gradually stabilized during the following phase of political maturity. It happened through an absolutely crucial partitioning of power. This was both between different institutionalized powers like courts, lawmaking and governments and between representations of different classes and interest-groups. Groups without representation were also involved in the shaping of laws. The balancing of society and the political system happened both through institutional balances / checks and through political surveillance of governments from oppositions and public opinion. You could say that the pluralism of societies was accommodated by making sure that institutions and politics mirrored the societal pluralism: rule itself was pluralistic i.e. collective.

 

This could be implemented through western representational democracy where the different societal groups elected and were guided by their political parties. But political pluralism could also be achieved in other ways, e.g. through one-party collective leaderships.

 

These systems functioned relatively well, but only as long as society and politics were mature. What this means is easier to see when we look at the following post-mature phase of declining late modernity.

 

The French philosopher Lyotard and others have suggested that we are entering a “postmodern” time, where belief in the political and religious ideologies disappear. But this vision mostly fits the intellectual elites and is a far too simple picture. Politics is certainly not dead yet. Neither is modernity.

 

We can divide late modernity and its political development into two sub-phases:

 

1) The present extreme polarization of societies and politics. It is not postmodern in the sense of lost interest in politics. As described in my earlier posts, politics becomes very simplified, but political (and religious) interest is not reduced. On the contrary, it is immensely increased and affects almost all. Even the once self-declared “postmodern” intellectuals become re-politicized and participate in the shitstorms. Every citizen and politician repeat the same predictable stereotypical extreme arguments and counter-arguments. People are no longer guided by responsible parties, but become puppets of the extreme opinions of other people and demagogues.

 

2) It is not until the second sub-phase of late modernity that interest in politics per se begins to disappear. But it is not replaced by a postmodern indifference. Meanings are as strong as before, but now they are no longer about the choice of policy. Instead the question is which person should be the ruler of one or more nations. Politics may be used as an argument, but both politics and parties are reduced to mere tools for power-hungry personalities. Rudiments of this are visible already now, but we have not yet arrived in this sub-phase.

 

That late modernity has this division into the two sub-phases, implies two different answers to what efficient rule is, one for each sub-phase. In the present polarized sub-phase the division or rupture of society has risen to levels which must be controlled. This can happen through a continuation of the pluralistic rule from mature modernity, but with the crucial difference, that it must now be authoritarian. In mature modernity societal and political diversities were accommodated. In the present first sub-phase of late modernity they must be controlled. Pluralistic rule must absolutely be continued, but with a reduction of influence of the political extremes. In two- or multiparty countries this implies that the center-oriented parts of the main political parties together exert a mildly authoritarian power. The political parties should be freed of influence of radicals. Formal power can shift between the parties via elections, but they should agree on important basics. Parties at the extremes must similarly be controlled, but not be outlawed. Angry people should be guided, but they need to have a voice. No attempt to crush them can succeed. The internet must be partly controlled to make sure that the angry voices and their fake news don’t get echoed and amplified and propagated.

 

In America this would mean that moderate Republicans and moderate Democrats de facto get rid of or better subdue their extreme wings and make an implicit alliance, which despite nominal elections controls society and politics in a moderately authoritarian manner. Obviously, a development like this is very unlikely in the United States. It may be too late now where the extremists in the GOP are taking over the party.

 

In one-party ruled countries the pluralistic authoritarian rule can naturally be in continuation of the collective rule of mature modernity.

 

 I repeat, in the present polarized first sub-phase of late modernity nations must still be ruled collectively in one- or multiparty conditions as they were in the preceding mature phase. But in order to ensure a degree of cohesion and inner and outer strength a certain degree of authoritarian rule is necessary. Here it is very important to distinguish between a) collective authoritarian rule and b) autocratic one-man rule. As long as societies and leaders are focused on politics and are divided and polarized, it is necessary that governance should encompass different opinions. Even though the extremes must be subdued, there should be a pluralistic/collective rule by people representing a certain width of diverging views. It is too narrow if only one person decides. In that case important societal and political forces are kept out of influence. This will result in counter-pressure, unrest, destabilization and sudden changes of power. 

 

Our goal in the present difficult times of trouble must be to keep our countries as stable as possible as long as possible through a measured control. The alternative is internal and external chaos and widespread suffering which will add to the effects of climate change. 

 

It is not until the last sub-phase of declining modernity where interest in politics per se disappears, that autocratic one-man rule can succeed and ultimately - in the universal empire after the end of modernity - become a lasting solution. One ruler can only hope to represent whole society, when politics is dead.

 

How to win the World - and lose it again

  

 

Nineveh, you have been hurt badly, and nothing can heal your wound. Everyone who hears the news of your destruction claps their hands. They are all happy, because they all felt the pain you caused again and again.

 

The prophet Nahum (3:19) on the fall of the Assyrian capital Nineveh.

 

As often said, the present Second European, now global Civilization is now in the late part of its modernity. This is a phase where few remaining big powers fight to gain control over the nations and create a universal state. In many earlier civilizations this endfight has been decided militarily. Because such a fight on the big scale today would be suicidal, we will rather see confrontations in other spheres. The internet will be the battlefield both in the form of direct cyber-warfare implying attacks on essential infrastructure etc. and a more subtle manipulation and competition to win support from the world’s public opinion. Because large scale military confrontations are excluded (as we must hope) and a direct cyber-attack on a superpower and its closest allies in present doctrines are viewed as a casus belli, hybrid internet-warfare and competition for sympathy will be of the utmost importance in deciding which power will take over the world: Minor powers can be convinced politically or economically or be bribed or persuaded to enter the sphere of a superpower, especially if this is perceived as benevolent. 

 

Even though direct internet-attacks from an opposing superpower against smaller powers allied to a superpower can cause war, this is not the case for cyber-attacks or pressure from a superpower on its own allies or on weak nations. Europe and Latin America should be prepared.

 

The importance of good PR has existed in the endfight in all civilizations, even the most militarily violent. In the following I will use examples from earlier civilizations to illustrate the balance between a) force and b) perceived benevolence. With “force” I mean things like military might, political coercion, economic pressure and presently cyber-attacks on essential services.

 

Obviously, the perceived benevolence or popularity of a major power has an inverse relation to its use of force, but it depends on numerous factors. These include propaganda and the unpopularity of opposing superpowers. It is also important to notice that the two factors, force and benevolence should be applied not in an erratic manner, but consistently as part of c) a longer term strategy.

 

 

MODELS AND EXAMPLES

Good models for our present endfight are the Greco-Roman Civilization, the Second Mesopotamian Civilization and the First Chinese Civilization. 

 

1) Rome, Greco-Roman Civilization 

The easiest example is if there is only one superpower and it only has weak opponents. Especially after the fall of Cartage around 200 BC Rome was in this position in the endfight in the Greco-Roman Civilization, at least around the Mediterranean Sea. Because of this Rome could win even though it was as divided and polarized as present America. But because of its inner chaos the victory was not total. The Roman empire had to leave the Eastern part of the Hellenist world with one of the world's largest cities, Seleucia, to Parthia.  

 

Rome was initially not very benevolent, but as peace arrived, it became more popular: the ruthless exploitation of the provinces was reduced, and Roman rule began to benefit both culture and commercial activity in the Mediterranean area. Parthia won the East not least by applying philhellenic policies, i.e. being friend of Hellenism, thus benevolent. This as opposed to the intolerant preceding Seleucid state, whose brutality is illustrated in the Maccabean books. So we got two lasting universal states. Both empires continued for centuries.

 

In the following examples power was immense, but despite this a lack of perceived benevolence resulting not least from brutality contributed to the defeat of these powers.

 

2) Assyria, Second Mesopotamian Civilization 

For a couple of centuries Assyria dominated the modernity in this civilization. Through repeated invasions and cruelty most peoples were subdued. A major opposing power, Elam, was even obliterated in 645 BC. But in the end the accumulated hatred caused Assyria’s defeat in 612 BC, cf. the quote in the top. This hindered that Assyria became the creator of the universal state of this civilization. Instead, Cyrus the Great accomplished this in 539 BC not least thanks to his kindness and tolerance. His Persian Empire was to last for two centuries. 

 

3) Germany, present Global Civilization 

Although far more short-lived and less dominant Germany from roughly 1870 to 1945 can be compared with Assyria. It was very strong militarily, but it became hated and was defeated in the end. Like Assyria Germany did not become the unifier of its / our civilization. In the East Japan through its aggression and expansion became similarly hated, and in the end it got the same fate.

 

4) Qin, First Chinese Civilization 

Here we have another version. The less civilized state Qin dominated a large part of the First Chinese modernity. For a long time its power over the other countries was big, but limited because of its bad standing in public opinion. Later it increased its internal cohesion, consistency, military strength and brutality. It did manage to create the universal empire, but fell a few years later in rebellions against its oppression of peoples and culture.

 

Thus, Qin was first limited by its unpopularity. Increased power then overrode the bad PR, but in the end it was nevertheless defeated because of its hated cruelty. Instead, the much milder Liu Bang and his Han Dynasty took over. This dynasty lasted four centuries.

 

 

APPLICATION

As often said, America can not afford its present level of inner conflicts and inconsistent changing policies. As opposed to Rome two millennia ago it has powerful opponents. If the United States on top of this also begins to lose popularity by brutalizing the world, long term defeat is almost inevitable.

 

Together China and Russia can rival America in power, but presently they are lacking popular support in many countries. This can limit the expansion and the duration of their spheres. Public opinion does matter if one wants to invite friends and ultimately win the World. It is not enough to win support from autocratic leaders or people on the political fringes.

 

If America does not grow more unpopular in world public opinion in and beyond the Middle East, and if the Americans could overcome the internal divisions, their power and relative demographic youth could ensure them by far the largest empire with only small spheres left to China and Russia. But a continued polarization and not least the possible return of Donald Trump or the like will ruin these prospects. Instead the United States could face civil war.

 

 

 

Encounter

 The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and the unbelievably polarized and nuance-less debates about it not only in the Middle East, but even in the Northern world is shocking. It is a good illustration of my recent posts about polarization. It shows that a polarized thinking which overrides even intelligence, is spreading from the Third World to the developed countries. Here I will look at the conflict from the viewpoint of differences between civilizations.

 

As often described, civilizations run in parallel, just displaced in time. They go through the same overall phases in eg. religion, philosophy, arts and political organization of society. With respect to the latter we may in chronological order call them

1 Feudal/religious societies 

which are ruled by a rural aristocracy and the higher echelons of the clergy.

 

2 States of estates. 

The single states are internally united under centralized rule. Cities and their third estate become important.

 

3 Absolute state. 

Motto “L’etat c’est moi” i.e. The King.

 

4 Modernity 

with internal turmoil and external conflicts.

 

5 Universal state 

with imperial rule over one United world (or two).

 

Before this sequence there is a phase of about five centuries of preparation, a

0 Pre-civilization.

 

Between the start of the Feudal/religious phase to the start of the Universal state there typically are roughly 1100 years, in our case from AD 1000 to 2100.

 

What happens then?

Old civilizations have very different destinies. The Universal Empires typically experience about 200 years of strength with expansion, eg.

• Rome from Augustus to Marc Aurel.

• China I during the Early Han Dynasty.

• The First Mesopotamian Civilization from Hammurabi to the Hittite invasion.

 

Possible destinies thereafter include:

1 After these two centuries they are very vulnerable and easily conquered by both civilized and barbaric peoples. If the invaders can not be assimilated the civilization can be terminated. This probably happened for the Indus Valley Civilization. 

 

2 The civilization gradually develops into another, eg. China I into China II, the Second Mesopotamian Civilization and the Eastern part of the Roman Empire into the Oriental Civilization.

 

3 There is also the possibility that the old civilization lingers on for centuries. This was the case for the Egyptian, the Oriental and the Second Chinese and the Second Indian Civilizations. 

 

Encounter between civilizations

This is a complicated topic with an infinite number of aspects and possibilities. Here I will only go into a few which can elucidate the present world.

 

First of all the cultural compatibility or difference in character or mindset of the meeting civilizations is extremely important.

 

Second, the result of a such encounter is dependent on the phases in which the two civilizations are.

 

Possibilities

1 The civilizations run in parallel like the First Mesopotamian and the Indus Valley civilizations. These were also culturally quite compatible. The encounter was mutually respectful and beneficial.

 

2 Another possibility is that one civilization is in its beginning while the other is in its modernity. In this case we not only have a potential difference in character. We also have an incompatibility in developmental phase. An example could be the meeting between feudal Southern Europe and the invading Oriental Arab forces which came from countries in a modernity. 

 

Another important example of this is especially relevant in our present situation: the encounter between the dominant Greco-Roman civilization in its modernity and the beginning Oriental Civilization. Such encounters entail extreme resistance from the young civilization because of incompatibility in phase. And this is even more extreme if as in this case the civilizations are culturally different. Here is not the place to go into details of the resistance 2000 years ago from Pontus, Parthia and the Jews and Christians, peoples which at this time were part of the Oriental world.

 

Presently we are witnessing a comparable situation where the young East European Civilization is fighting dominance from our civilization.

 

3 A further possibility is if a strong civilization in its modernity meets an old civilization in a very late phase. If they are not too culturally incompatible the old civilization will after an initial strong resistance fuse with the new in a selective assimilation while at the same time keeping significant parts of its cultural heritage. Examples are China and India where the resistance against our civilization was fierce one and a half century ago. But since then they have taken over important parts of our world from Marxism or democracy to technology.

 

The meeting between our and the now old Oriental Civilization is a somewhat deviant example of this. The differences in both phase and culture are bigger. As described in earlier posts the situation is somewhat similar to the one 2000 years ago. Just as then the Oriental now primary Moslem civilization is faced with a strong European Civilization (including America). It is as if the Roman Empire has been reborn in the shape of the United States. The crucial difference is that the Orient two millennia ago was ascending while it now is very old. As in the other old civilizations India and China there was from the start a strong resistance against our civilization. But unlike the two other cases the Orient still resists assimilation. There are probably at least four reasons for this:

1 The large difference in developmental phase.

 

2 A large cultural difference. This is also visible in the racist populist political parties in the Northern world.

It also means that the global religious syncretism predicted by Toynbee will be more difficult.

 

3 A further contributor is the special trait of Oriental nations which means that they often prefer to live dispersed between each other in locally segregated enclaves or parallel societies. This means that peoples in or from the Orient often do not intermingle with people from our civilization.

 

4 The policy and actions of Israel (now obviously a part of our civilization) and perceived American support for it can also perpetuate the Oriental resistance and thus hinder the reconciliation and fusing of the Oriental with our civilization. It can help China in its competition for influence as this power with its long term strategic thinking is more predictable and also in the Orient is seen as a less culturally antagonistic part of our civilization. The alienation of the Oriental populations from America can destabilize the whole Middle East: peoples from North Africa to Pakistan and beyond could turn against Israel and the West and against local regimes who cooperate with them. In the long term an Oriental civilization continuing to resist assimilation is not useful for a future unification of the world into a Universal State. We would then have two opposing worlds instead of only East Europe.

 

 

Suffering of Children

 imagine that you are charged with building the edifice of human destiny, whose ultimate aim is to bring people happiness, to give them peace and contentment at last, but that in order to achieve this it is essential and unavoidable to torture just one little speck of creation, that same little child beating her breast with her little fists, and imagine that this edifice has to be erected on her unexpiated tears. Would you agree to be the architect under those conditions? Tell me honestly!”

“No, I wouldn’t agree,” said Alyosha quietly.

Models and controls

 INTRODUCTION

 

I am often using phenomena and developments in other earlier civilizations to elucidate and understand what is happening and will happen in our civilization. Generalized, civilizations can serve as models for each other. This can be the case for the civilization as a whole or only for certain phases in their overall development or certain aspects within a phase.

 

To recapitulate, human history has seen more than ten great civilizations, each with a duration of at least 1500 years. 

Examples

The First Mesopotamian Civilization ca. 3000 - 1500 BC

The Greco-Roman Civilization or First European Civilization ca. 1300 BC to AD 500.

 

The First Chinese Civilization ca. 1500 BC to AD 200, and the Second ca. year 0 to 1900.

 

On the large scale the civilizations run in parallel with comparable phases and developments, just displaced in time. Thus the Greco-Roman Civilization goes through the same developments 2100 years before we do. The First Chinese Civilization 2300 years before, the Second 900, the Oriental Civilization 1000 years and so on.

 

But crucially, they are not copies of each other. Each civilization has what we may call its own unique soul or mind-set. Besides, they have different experiences which also shape them individually. Civilizations must not be understood and defined in an Aristotelean manner as all containing the same fixed set of necessary and sufficient characteristics. A prototypical definition is more suited. This entails a not clearly delimited number of characteristics. Not all are shared by all civilizations. This means that they can resemble each other in different degrees, both as wholes and in certain phases and in certain aspects. Two civilizations can look quite dissimilar, but they both have similarities with the prototype which is the average of them all. It is also important that a word which for some historians denotes a phenomenon is often better seen as name for a phase within a civilization. An example is “feudalism”. For some this is a phenomenon with an exact definition corresponding precisely to the European condition in medieval times. We instead see it as a phase, a phase which does entail large landowners, but can vary in shape between civilizations. Importantly it lies at a specified time in their histories 800 years before modernity. It is accompanied by certain developments in other spheres, for example religious theorizing. Thus to be identified as a certain phenomenon and a phase in a civilization it must contain certain characteristics AND coexist with certain other phenomena AND come at a certain time compared to certain other phases. Such considerations also mean that absolute kingdom when seen as a phase cannot be equated with all examples of hereditary autocratic rule.

 

Modernities are like other periods characterized by conflicts within and between countries, but they must also lie at a specific time-span in each civilization. And they must be accompanied by rationalism, political ideas and progress in science and technology.

 

Despite the differences the similarities between civilizations are so big that by looking at them we can gain understanding of our own Western or Second European Civilization which is now global. Previous ones can serve as models depending on their relatedness. In some cases a specific civilization does not deliver a good model for us. This can be caused by:

1) our lack of knowledge.

2) the civilization is not closely mentally related.

3) nomadic invasions.

4) disasters.

 

 In understanding our case as a whole the Greco-Roman Civilization and the First and Second Chinese Civilizations are good models. These are closely related to our own. Others like the Oriental Civilization seem less related. The Indus Valley Civilization is also a bad model, but only because of the lack of knowledge about it.

 

Looking more narrowly at our absolute kings from roughly 1600 to 1800 the Mayan city-states in the Meso-American Civilization is a good model. But in understanding the break-down of this system the Mayans are a bad model because of their agricultural disaster.

 

Even more specifically, in understanding the scientific developments in our modernity, both the modernities in the Greco-Roman Civilization, the Oriental Civilization and the two Chinese Civilizations are good models.

 

It is fascinating that in most cases the two European and the two Chinese civilizations, i.e. those at the two ends of Eurasia are those which most closely resemble each other.

 

 

CHECKS AND BALANCES MONOPOLIZED

 

To elucidate present internal political conditions in the United States the modernities in the Greco-Roman Civilization, especially the Roman Republic, and the Second Chinese Civilization, especially the Song Dynasty can serve as good models. In this case the models not only help us understand our own development. They can also help us avoid mistakes and change the course and thus affect our future.

 

In these three cases, Rome, Song and United States, we have an elaborated system of checks and balances in admirable attempts to hinder monopolies of power and to achieve a balance between societal groups and opinions. Here it must be noted that China in the Song-dynasty most of the time was a constitutional monarchy with limited power to the emperor.

 

But in all three cases these power-sharing constitutions came /comes under pressure. In our case we see attacks on the partitioning into three powers proposed by Montesquieu. A magical word today is“overreach”. Institutions which are part of the checks an balances are accused of overreach if they limit the power of a party or group. Such controlling institutions are seen as not controls, but as competitors for power. This can indeed become the case as political parties try to monopolize these institutions. This is evident in the present United States as it was in the Roman Republic and in Song. Another bad word is “deep state”, i.e. an administrative apparatus of a certain size with experience, experts and written and unwritten procedures and traditions. This is seen as an enemy and opponent because it can hinder the worst effects of irresponsible political attempts to alter society in a radical way.

 

In Rome the fight for control of institutions ultimately overstressed the constitution and led to the end of the Republic in a crescendo of violence. The developments in the United States are correspondingly getting out of hand and can move the same way unless especially the Republican Party is reformed.

 

In the following I reuse parts of an earlier post which sketched developments in the Roman Republic and America.

 

The Roman constitution was a complicated mixture of different positions of power like Senate, Peoples Assembly, Consuls and  Peoples Tribune, some having been added at new situations in history demanding a share of power to new societal forces. Together such institutions secured an intricate system of checks and balances like the American Constitution. 

 

In the Song constitution power was balanced between the Prime minister(s), other ministers often from political oppositions, Secretariate, endless controls and rewritings of law-proposals, emperor, Censors (= Ombudsmen), Remonstrance Office, public opinion and even protests from university students just to mention some.

 

Obviously such systems risk causing  instability and inaction and inability to handle internal and foreign threats. For such situations the Roman constitution allowed the employment of a time-limited and accountable dictator. In Song China a time-limited de facto dictator often emerged in times of crises. It could typically be the prime minister.

 

All three systems of balance and mutual control were admirable and the constitutions functioned reasonably well for a long time. But at a certain point the tensions in society and the polarization between people from the two major political parties a) Peoples Party / Democrats / Reformists and b) Senate Party / Republicans / Conservatives became too big. The tension and polarity could not any longer be channeled through and within the means of the Constitution. This happened in Rome around 130 BC, in China around 1100 and in America around 2000. At this point different institutions of the state risk to be monopolized by one party while others try to remain neutral controls, and again others are used by the other party. They make opposing decisions and try to obstruct each other. This increases societal and political tensions further. As said this process began in Rome from around 130 BC and is now increasingly clear in the United States. The Democrat left and the Republican right have their opposing extreme agendas, the neutral FBI tries to carry on its duties, the two chambers of Congress are often overtaken by opposite parties unwilling to compromise, Supreme Court is taken over by conservatives. We even see a tendency for the courts in different states and on different levels to become political. Such developments can be expected to continue and worsen and create much bitterness on the street and between the parties. Politicians will use drastic means to get and keep control of institutions and positions and to seize them from other politicians. One of the reasons why things went so utterly bad in Rome was that this republic was not very deep and thus lacked an important stabilizing factor. Therefore it is dangerous that US politicians work to undermine the hated deep state.

 

Once more we must ask whether a such development is necessary? And once more the Second Chinese modernity during the Song Dynasty sticks out. In the decades around 1100 there also here was an extreme and dangerous polarization between left-wing Reformists and right-wing Conservatives. The parties monopolized the power-sharing institutions and launched countless impeachment procedures against opponents.

 

But then came the catastrophic military defeat to Jin around 1130 resulting in a major territorial loss. After this the internal political turmoils continued in new forms. But gradually the political polarizations eased a little. Certainly not to zero. The“Roman”and “American” malpractices continued and at times made some institutional controls ineffective and untrustworthy. But the internal tensions did not lead to the Roman end in the form of a hereditary universal dictatorship under emperors. There can be more reasons for this. One was the very deep Song state. Another was that the political landscape was gradually transformed. The two parties were now what we may call the Pragmatists and the Constitutional Neo-Confucian Daoxue- party. The first of these bent the power-sharing principles to meet real needs and circumstances while the latter put the ideal power-sharing above all.

 

The Song example shows that America does not have to follow the Roman way, where the Republic ended in civil wars and ultimately led to Augustus seizing all power.